phenomenology of mind-第20部分

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present　time　is　in　the　main　more　highly　cultivated；　its　curiosity　more　quickened　and　alert；　and　its
judgment　more　swiftly　made　up　and　pronounced；　so　that　the　feet　of　those　who　will　carry　you　out
are　already　at　the　door：　at　the　same　time　we　have　often　to　distinguish　from　all　this　the　slower　and
more　gradual　effect　which　rectifies　the　direction　of　attention　caught　and　compelled　by　imposing
assurances；　corrects；　too；　contemptuous　censure；　and　after　a　little　provides　a　contemporary
audience　for　one　part；　while　another　after　a　temporary　vogue　finds　no　audience　with　posterity　any
longer。　

For　the　rest；　at　a　time　when　the　universal　nature　of　spiritual　life　has　become　so　very　much
emphasized　and　strengthened；　and　the　mere　individual　aspect　has　become；　as　it　should　be；
correspondingly　a　matter　of　indifference；　when；　too；　that　universal　aspect　holds；　by　the　entire　range
of　its　substance；　the　full　measure　of　the　wealth　it　has　built　up；　and　lays　claim　to　it　all；　the　share　in
the　total　work　of　mind　that　falls　to　the　activity　of　any　particular　individual　can　only　be　very　small。
Because　this　is　so；　the　individual　must　all　the　more　forget　himself；　as　in　fact　the　very　nature　of
science　implies　and　requires　that　he　should；　and　he　must；　moreover；　become　and　do　what　he　can。
But　all　the　less　must　be　demanded　of　him；　just　as　he　can　expect　the　less　from　himself；　and　may　ask
the　less　for　himself。




INTRODUCTION

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　1

It　is　natural　to　suppose　that；　before　philosophy　enters　upon　its　subject　proper…namely；　the　actual
knowledge　of　what　trulv　is…it　is　necessary　to　come　first　to　an　understanding　concerning　knowledge；
which　is　looked　upon　as　the　instrument　by　which　to　take　possession　of　the　Absolute；　or　as　the
means　through　which　to　get　a　sight　of　it。　The　apprehension　seems　legitimate；　on　the　one　hand　that
there　may　be　various　kinds　of　knowledge；　among　which　one　might　be　better　adapted　than　another
for　the　attainment　of　our　purpose…and　thus　a　wrong　choice　is　possible：　on　the　other　hand　again
that；　since　knowing　is　a　faculty　of　a　definite　kind　and　with　a　determinate　range；　without　the　more
precise　determination　of　its　nature　and　limits　we　might　take　hold　on　clouds　of　error　instead　of　the
heaven　of　truth。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　2

This　apprehensiveness　is　sure　to　pass　even　into　the　conviction　that　the　whole　enterprise　which　sets
out　to　secure　for　consciousness　by　means　of　knowledge　what　exists　per　se；　is　in　its　very　nature
absurd；　and　that　between　knowledge　and　the　Absolute　there　lies　a　boundary　which　completely
cuts　off　the　one　from　the　other。　For　if　knowledge　is　the　instrument　by　which　to　get　possession　of
absolute　Reality；　the　suggestion　immediately　occurs　that　the　application　of　an　instrument　to
anything　does　not　leave　it　as　it　is　for　itself；　but　rather　entails　in　the　process；　and　has　in　view；　a
moulding　and　alteration　of　it。　Or；　again；　if　knowledge　is　not　an　instrument　which　we　actively
employ；　but　a　kind　of　passive　medium　through　which　the　light　of　the　truth　reaches　us；　then　here；
too；　we　do　not　receive　it　as　it　is　in　itself　。　but　as　it　is　through　and　in　this　medium。　In　either　case　we
employ　a　means　which　immediately　brings　about　the　very　opposite　of　its　own　end；　or；　rather；　the
absurdity　lies　in　making　use　of　any　means　at　all。　It　seems　indeed　open　to　us　to　find　in　the
knowledge　of　the　way　in　which　the　instrument　operates；　a　remedy　for　this　parlous　state；　for
thereby　it　becomes　possible　to　remove　from　the　result　the　part　which；　in　our　idea　of　the　Absolute
received　through　that　instrument；　belongs　to　the　instrument；　and　thus　to　get　the　truth　in　its　purity。
But　this　improvement　would；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　only　bring　us　back　to　the　point　where　we　were
before。　If　we　take　away　again　from　a　definitely　formed　thing　that　which　the　instrument　has　done　in
the　shaping　of　it；　then　the　thing　（in　this　case　the　Absolute）　stands　before　us　once　more　just　as　it
was　previous　to　all　this　trouble；　which；　as　we　now　see；　was　superfluous。　If　the　Absolute　were　only
to　be　brought　on　the　whole　nearer　to　us　by　this　agency；　without　any　change　being　wrought　in　it；
like　a　bird　caught　by　a　limestick；　it　would　certainly　scorn　a　trick　of　that　sort；　if　it　were　not　in　its
very　nature；　and　did　it　not　wish　to　be；　beside　us　from　the　start。　For　a　trick　is　what　knowledge　in
such　a　case　would　be；　since　by　all　its　busy　toil　and　trouble　it　gives　itself　the　air　of　doing　something
quite　different　from　bringing　about　a　relation　that　is　merely　immediate；　and　so　a　waste　of　time　to
establish。　Or；　again；　if　the　examination　of　knowledge；　which　we　represent　as　a　medium；　makes　us
acquainted　with　the　law　of　its　refraction；　it　is　likewise　useless　to　eliminate　this　refraction　from　the
result。　For　knowledge　is　not　the　divergence　of　the　ray；　but　the　ray　itself　by　which　the　truth　comes
in　contact　with　us；　and　if　this　be　removed；　the　bare　direction　or　the　empty　place　would　alone　be
indicated。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　3

Meanwhile；　if　the　fear　of　falling　into　error　introduces　an　element　of　distrust　into　science；　which
without　any　scruples　of　that　sort　goes　to　work　and　actually　does　know；　it　is　not　easy　to　understand
why；　conversely；　a　distrust　should　not　be　placed　in　this　very　distrust；　and　why　we　should　not　take
care　lest　the　fear　of　error　is　not　just　the　initial　error。　As　a　matter　of　fact；　this　fear　presupposes
something；　indeed　a　great　deal；　as　truth；　and　supports　its　scruples　and　consequences　on　what
should　itself　be　examined　beforehand　to　see　whether　it　is　truth。　It　starts　with　ideas　of　knowledge　as
an　instrument；　and　as　a　medium；　and　presupposes　a　distinction　of　ourselves　from　this　knowledge。
More　especially　it　takes　for　granted　that　the　Absolute　stands　on　one　side；　and　that　knowledge　on
the　other　side；　by　itself　and　cut　off　from　the　Absolute；　is　still　something　real；　in　other　words；　that
knowledge；　which；　by　being　outside　the　Absolute；　is　certainly　also　outside　truth；　is　nevertheless
true…a　position　which；　while　calling　itself　fear　of　error；　makes　itself　known　rather　as　fear　of　the
truth。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　4

This　conclusion　comes　from　the　fact　that　the　Absolute　alone　is　true　or　that　the　True　is　alone
absolute；　It　may　be　set　aside　by　making　the　distinction　that　a　know　ledge　which　does　not　indeed
know　the　Absolute　as　science　wants　to　do；　is　none　the　less　true　too；　and　that　knowledge　in
general；　though　it　may　possibly　be　incapable　of　grasping　the　Absolute；　can　still　be　capable　of　truth
of　another　kind。　But　we　shall　see　as　we　proceed　that　random　talk　like　this　leads　in　the　long　run　to　a
confused　distinction　between　the　absolute　truth　and　a　truth　of　some　other　sort；　and　that　〃absolute〃；
〃knowledge〃；　and　so　on；　are　words　which　presuppose　a　meaning　that　has　first　to　be　got　at。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　5

With　suchlike　useless　ideas　and　expressions　about　knowledge；　as　an　instrument　to　take　hold　of　the
Absolute；　or　as　a　medium　through　which　we　have　a　glimpse　of　truth；　and　so　on　（relations　to　which
all　these　ideas　of　a　knowledge　which　is　divided　from　the　Absolute　and　an　Absolute　divided　from
knowledge　in　the　last　resort　lead）；　we　need　not　concern　ourselves。　Nor　need　we　trouble　about　the
evasive　pretexts　which　create　the　incapacity　of　science　out　of　the　presupposition　of　such　relations；
in　order　at　once　to　be　rid　of　the　toil　of　science；　and　to　assume　the　air　of　serious　and　zealous　effort
about　it。　Instead　of　being　troubled　with　giving　answers　to　all　these；　they　may　be　straightway
rejected　as　adventitious　and　arbitrary　ideas；　and　the　use　which　is　here　made　of　words　like
〃absolute〃；〃knowledge〃；　as　also　〃objective〃　and　〃subjective〃；　and　innumerable　others；　whose
meaning　is　assumed　to　be　familiar　to　everyone；　might　well　be　regarded　as　so　much　deception。　For
to　give　out　that　their　significance　is　universally　familiar　and　that　everyone　indeed　possesses　their
notion；　rather　looks　like　an　attempt　to　dispense　with　the　only　important　matter；　which　is　just　to　give
this　notion。　With　better　right；　on　the　contrary；　we　might　spare　ourselves　the　trouble　of　talking　any
notice　at　all　of　such　ideas　and　ways　of　talking　which　would　have　the　effect　of　warding　off　science
altogether；　for　they　make　a　mere　empty　show　of　knowledge　which　at　once　vanishes　when　science
comes　on　the　scene。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　6

But　science；　in　the　very　fact　that　it　comes　on　the　scene；　is　itself　a　phenomenon；　its　〃coming　on　the
scene〃　is　not　yet　itself　carried　out　in　all　the　length　and　breadth　of　its　truth。　In　this　regard；　it　is　a
matter　of　indifference　whether　we　consider　that　it　（science）　is　the　phenomenon　because　it　makes
its　appearance　alongside　another　kind　of　knowledge；　or　call　that　other　untrue　knowledge　its
process　of　appearing。　Science；　however；　must　liberate　itself　from　this　phenomenality；　and　it　can
only　do　so　by　turning　against　it。　For　science　cannot　simply　reject　a　form　of　knowledge　which　is　not
true；　and　treat　this　as　a　common　view　of　things；　and　then　assure　us　that　itself　is　an　entirely　different
kind　of　knowledge；　and　holds　the　other　to　be　of　no　account　at　all；　nor　can　it　appeal　to　the　fact　that
in　this　other　there　are　presages　of　a　better。　By　giving　that　assurance　it　would　declare　its　force　and
value　to　lie　in　its　bare　existence；　but　the　untrue　knowledge　appeals　likewise　to　the　fact　that　it　is；
and　assures　us　that　to　it　science　is　nothing。　One　barren　assurance；　however；　is　of　just　as　much
value　as　another。　Still　less　can　science　appeal　to　the　presages　of　a　better；　which　are　to　be　found
present　in　untrue　knowledge　and　are　there　pointing　the　way　towards　science；　for　it　would；　on　the
one　hand；　be　appealing　again　in　the　same　way　to　a　merely　existent　fact；　and；　on　the　other；　it　would
be　appealing　to　itself；　to　the　way　in　which　it　exists　in　untrue　knowledge；　i。e。　to　a　bad　form　of　its
own　existence；　to　its　appearance；　rather　than　to　its　real　and　true　nature　（an　und　für　sich）。　For　this
reason　we　shall　here　undertake　the　exposition　of　knowledge　as　a　phenomenon。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　7

Now　because　this　exposition　has　for　its　object　only　phenomenal　knowledge；　the　exposition　itself
seems　not