phenomenology of mind-第21部分

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Now　because　this　exposition　has　for　its　object　only　phenomenal　knowledge；　the　exposition　itself
seems　not　to　be　science；　free；　self…moving　in　the　shape　proper　to　itself；　but　may；　from　this　point　of
view；　be　taken　as　the　pathway　of　the　natural　consciousness　which　is　pressing　forward　to　true
knowledge。　Or　it　can　be　regarded　as　the　path　of　the　soul；　which　is　traversing　the　series　of　its　own
forms　of　embodiment；　like　stages　appointed　for　it　by　its　own　nature；　that　it　may　possess　the
clearness　of　spiritual　life　when；　through　the　complete　experience　of　its　own　self；　it　arrives　at　the
knowledge　of　what　it　is　in　itself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　8

Natural　consciousness　will　prove　itself　to　be　only　knowledge　in　principle　or　not　real　knowledge。
Since；　however；　it　immediately　takes　itself　to　be　the　real　and　genuine　knowledge；　this　pathway　has
a　negative　significance　for　it；　what　is　a　realization　of　the　notion　of　knowledge　means　for　it　rather　the
ruin　and　overthrow　of　itself；　for　on　this　road　it　loses　its　own　truth。　Because　of　that；　the　road　can　be
looked　on　as　the　path　of　doubt；　or　more　properly　a　highway　of　despair。　For　what　happens　there　is
not　what　is　usually　understood　by　doubting；　a　jostling　against　this　or　that　supposed　truth；　the
outcome　of　which　is　again　a　disappearance　in　due　course　of　the　doubt　and　a　return　to　the　former
truth；　so　that　at　the　end　the　matter　is　taken　as　it　was　before。　On　the　contrary；　that　pathway　is　the
conscious　insight　into　the　untruth　of　the　phenomenal　knowledge；　for　which　that　is　the　most　real
which　is　after　all　only　the　unrealized　notion。　On　that　account；　too；　this　thoroughgoing　scepticism　is
not　what　doubtless　earnest　zeal　for　truth　and　science　fancies　it　has　equipped　itself　with　in　order　to
be　ready　to　deal　with　them…viz。　the　resolve；　in　science；　not　to　deliver　itself　over　to　the　thoughts　of
others　on　their　mere　authority；　but　to　examine　everything　for　itself；　and　only　follow　its　own
conviction；　or；　still　better；　to　produce　everything　itself　and　hold　only　its　own　act　for　true。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　9

The　series　of　shapes；　which　consciousness　traverses　on　this　road；　is　rather　the　detailed　history　of
the　process　of　training　and　educating　consciousness　itself　up　to　the　level　of　science。　That　resolve
presents　this　mental　development　（Bildung）　in　the　simple　form　of　an　intended　purpose；　as
immediately　finished　and　complete；　as　having　taken　place；　this　pathway；　on　the　other　hand；　is；　as
opposed　to　this　abstract　intention；　or　untruth；　the　actual　carrying　out　of　that　process　of
development。　To　follow　one's　own　conviction　is　certainly　more　than　to　hand　oneself　over　to
authority；　but　by　the　conversion　of　opinion　held　on　authority　into　opinion　held　out　of　personal
conviction；　the　content　of　what　is　held　is　not　necessarily　altered；　and　truth　has　not　thereby　taken
the　place　of　error。　If　we　stick　to　a　system　of　opinion　and　prejudice　resting　on　the　authority　of
others；　or　upon　personal　conviction；　the　one　differs　from　the　other　merely　in　the　conceit　which
animates　the　latter。　Scepticism；　directed　to　the　whole　compass　of　phenomenal　consciousness；　on
the　contrary；　makes　mind　for　the　first　time　qualified　to　test　what　truth　is；　since　it　brings　about　a
despair　regarding　what　are　called　natural　views；　thoughts；　and　opinions；　which　it　is　matter　of
indifference　to　call　personal　or　belonging　to　others；　and　with　which　the　consciousness；　that
proceeds　straight　away　to　criticize　and　test；　is　still　filled　and　hampered；　thus　being；　as　a　matter　of
fact；　incapable　of　what　it　wants　to　undertake。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　10

The　completeness　of　the　forms　of　unreal　consciousness　will　be　brought　about　precisely　through　the
necessity　of　the　advance　and　the　necessity　of　their　connection　with　one　another。　To　make　this
comprehensible　we　may　remark；　by　way　of　preliminary；　that　the　exposition　of　untrue
consciousness　in　its　untruth　is　not　a　merely　negative　process。　Such　a　one…sided　view　of　it　is　what
the　natural　consciousness　generally　adopts；　and　a　knowledge；　which　makes　this　one…sidedness　its
essence；　is　one　of　those　shapes　assumed　by　incomplete　consciousness　which　falls　into　the　course
of　the　inquiry　itself　and　will　come　before　us　there。　For　this　view　is　scepticism；　which　always　sees　in
the　result　only　pure　nothingness；　and　abstracts　from　the　fact　that　this　nothing　is　determinate；　is　the
nothing　of　that　out　of　which　it　comes　as　a　result。　Nothing；　however；　is　only；　in　fact；　the　true　result；
when　taken　as　the　nothing　of　what　it　comes　from；　it　is　thus　itself　a　determinate　nothing；　and　has　a
content。　The　scepticism　which　ends　with　the　abstraction　〃nothing〃　or　〃emptiness〃　can　advance
from　this　not　a　step　farther；　but　must　wait　and　see　whether　there　is　possibly　anything　new　offered；
and　what　that　is…in　order　to　cast　it　into　the　same　abysmal　void。　When　once；　on　the　other　hand；　the
result　is　apprehended；　as　it　truly　is；　as　determinate　negation；　a　new　form　has　thereby　immediately
arisen；　and　in　the　negation　the　transition　is　made　by　which　the　progress　through　the　complete
succession　of　forms　comes　about　of　itself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　11

The　goal；　however；　is　fixed　for　knowledge　just　as　necessarily　as　the　succession　in　the　process。　The
terminus　is　at　that　point　where　knowledge　is　no　longer　compelled　to　go　beyond　itself；　where　it
finds　its　own　self；　and　the　notion　corresponds　to　the　object　and　the　object　to　the　notion。　The
progress　towards　this　goal　consequently　is　without　a　halt；　and　at　no　earlier　stage　is　satisfaction　to
be　found。　That　which　is　confined　to　a　life　of　nature　is　unable　of　itself　to　go　beyond　its　immediate
existence；　but　by　something　other　than　itself　it　is　forced　beyond　that；　and　to　be　thus　wrenched　out
of　its　setting　is　its　death。　Consciousness；　however；　is　to　itself　its　own　notion；　thereby　it　immediately
transcends　what　is　limited；　and；　since　this　latter　belongs　to　it；　consciousness　transcends　its　own
self。　Along　with　the　particular　there　is　at　the　same　time　set　up　the　〃beyond〃；　were　this　only；　as　in
spatial　intuition；　beside　what　is　limited。　Consciousness；　therefore；　suffers　this　violence　at　its　own
hands；　it　destroys　its　own　limited　satisfaction。　When　feeling　of　violence；　anxiety　for　the　truth　may
well　withdraw；　and　struggle　to　preserve　for　itself　that　which　is　in　danger　of　being　lost。　But　it　can
find　no　rest。　Should　that　anxious　fearfulness　wish　to　remain　always　in　unthinking　indolence；　thought
will　agitate　the　thoughtlessness；　its　restlessness　will　disturb　that　indolence。　Or　let　it　take　its　stand　as
a　form　of　sentimentality　which　assures　us　it　finds　everything　good　in　its　kind；　and　this　assurance
likewise　will　suffer　violence　at　the　hands　of　reason；　which　finds　something　not　good　just　because
and　in　so　far　as　it　is　a　kind。　Or；　again；　fear　of　the　truth　may　conceal　itself　from　itself　and　others
behind　the　pretext　that　precisely　burning　zeal　for　the　very　truth　makes　it　so　difficult；　nay　impossible；
to　find　any　other　truth　except　that　of　which　alone　vanity　is　capable…that　of　being　ever　so　much
cleverer　than　any　ideas；　which　one　gets　from　oneself　or　others；　could　make　possible。　This　sort　of
conceit　which　understands　how　to　belittle　every　truth　and　turn　away　from　it　back　into　itself；　and
gloats　over　this　its　own　private　understanding；　which　always　knows　how　to　dissipate　every
possible　thought；　and　to　find；　instead　of　all　the　content；　merely　the　barren　Ego…this　is　a　satisfaction
which　must　be　left　to　itself；　for　it　flees　the　universal　and　seeks　only　an　isolated　existence　on　its　own
account　（Fürsichseyn）。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　12

As　the　foregoing　has　been　stated；　provisionally　and　in　general；　concerning　the　manner　and　the
necessity　Of　the　process　of　the　inquiry；　it　may　also　be　of　further　service　to　make　some
observations　regarding　the　method　of　carrying　this　out。　This　exposition；　viewed　as　a　process　of
relating　science　to　phenomenal　knowledge；　and　as　an　inquiry　and　critical　examination　into　the
reality　of　knowing；　does　not　seem　able　to　be　effected　without　some　presupposition　which　is　laid
down　as　an　ultimate　criterion。　For　an　examination　consists　in　applying　an　accepted　standard；　and；
on　the　final　agreement　or　disagreement　therewith　of　what　is　tested；　deciding　whether　the　latter　is
right　or　wrong；　and　the　standard　in　general；　and　so　science；　were　this　the　criterion；　is　thereby
accepted　as　the　essence　or　inherently　real　（Ausich）。　But；　here；。　where　science　first　appears　on　the
scene；　neither　science　nor　any　sort　of　standard　has　justified　itself　as　the　essence　or　ultimate　reality；
and　without　this　no　examination　seems　able　to　be　instituted。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　13

This　contradiction　and　the　removal　of　it　will　become　more　definite　if　；　to　begin　with；　we　call　to
mind　the　abstract　determinations　of　knowledge　and　of　truth　as　they　are　found　in　consciousness。
Consciousness；　we　find；　distinguishes　from　itself　something；　to　which　at　the　same　time　it　relates
itself；　or；　to　use　the　current　expression；　there　is　something　for　consciousness；　and　the　determinate
form　of　this　process　of　relating；　or　of　there　being　something　for　a　consciousness；　is　knowledge。　But
from　this　being　for　another　we　distinguish　being　in　itself　or　per　se；　what　is　related　to　knowledge　is
likewise　distinguished　from　it；　and　posited　as　also　existing　outside　this　relation；　the　aspect　of　being
per　se　or　in　itself　is　called　Truth。　What　really　lies　in　these　determinations　does　not　further　concern
us　here；　for　since　the　object　of　our　inquiry　is　phenomenal　knowledge。；　its　determinations　are　also
taken　up；　in　the　first　instance；　as　they　are　immediately　offered　to　us。　And　they　are　offered　to　us
very　much　in　the　way　we　have　just　stated。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　14

If　now　our　inquiry　deals　with　the　truth　of　knowledge；　it　appears　that　we　are　inquiring　what
knowledge　is　in　itself。　But　in　this　inquiry　knowledge　is　our　object；　it　is　for　us；　and　the　essential
nature　（Ansich）　of　knowledge；　were　this　to　come　to　light；　would　be　rather　its　being　for　us：　what
we　should　assert　to　be　its　essence　would　rather　be；　not　the　truth　of　knowledge；　but　only　our
knowledge　of　it。　The