phenomenology of mind-第32部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


and　superficial；　and　in　consequence　we　find　as　a　fact；　not　the　unity　of　these　various　determinate
laws；　but　a　law　which　leaves　out　their　specific　character；　just　as　the　one　law；　which　combines　in
itself　the　laws　of　falling　terrestrial　bodies；　and　of　the　movements　of　celestial　bodies；　does　not；　in
point　of　fact；　express　both　kinds　of　laws。　The　unification　of　all　laws　in　universal　attraction
expresses　no　further　content　than　just　the　bare　concept　of　the　law　itself；　a　concept　which　is　therein
set　down　as　existing。　Universal　attraction　says　merely　that　everything　has　a　constant　distinction　for
anything　else。　Understanding　pretends　by　that　to　have　found　a　universal　law　which　gives
expression　to　universal　reality　as　such；　but；　in　point　of　fact；　it　has　merely　found　the　conception　of
law　itself；　although　in　such　a　way　that　it　at　the　same　time　thereby　declares　all　reality　to　be　in　its　very
nature　conformed　to　law。　The　idea　of　universal　attraction　has；　therefore；　to　this　extent　great
importance；　that　it　is　directed　against　that　unthinking　way　of　representing　reality；　to　which
everything　appears　in　the　shape　of　accident　and　chance；　and　for　which　determinateness；
specificity；　takes　the　form　of　sensuous　independence。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（1）　Specific　Law　and　General　Law

In　contrast；　then；　with　determinate　laws　stands　universal　attraction；　or　the　bare　conception　of　law。
In　so　far　as　this　pure　conception　is　looked　on　as　the　essentially　real；　or　as　the　true　inner　being；　the
determinateness　characterizing　the　specific　law　itself　belongs　still　to　the　sphere　of　appearance；　or
rather　to　sensible　existence。　But　the　pure　conception　of　law　transcends　not　merely　the　law；　which；
being　itself　a　determinate　law；　stands　contrasted　with　other　determinate　laws；　but　also　transcends
law　as　such。　The　determinateness；　of　which　we　spoke；　is　itself　strictly　a　mere　vanishing　moment
which　can　no　longer　come　forward　here　as　an　essential　entity　（Wesenheit）；　for　it　is　only　the　law
which　is　the　truth　here：　but　the　conception　of　law　is　turned　against　the　law　itself。　That　is　to　say；　in
the　law　distinction　itself　is　immediately　apprehended　and　taken　up　into　the　universal；　thereby；
however；　making　the　moments；　whose　relation　it　expresses；　subsist　as　mutually　indifferent　and
inherently　real　entities。　These　parts　of　the　distinction　found　in　the　law　are；　however；　at　the　same
time　themselves。　determinate　aspects。　The　pure　concept　of　law；　as　universal　attraction；　must；　to
get　its　true　significance；　be　so　apprehended　that　in　it；　as　the　absolutely　single　and　simple；　the
distinctions　which　are　present　in　law　as　such；　return　again　themselves　into　the　inner　being；　qua　bare
and　simple　unity。　This　unity　is　the　inner　〃necessity〃　of　the　law。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（2）　Law　and　Force

The　law　is　thereby　present　in　a　twofold　form。　In　one　case　it　is　there　as　law　in　which　the　differences
are　expressed　as　independent　moments；　in　the　other　it　is　in　the　form　of　a　simple　withdrawal　into
itself；　which　again　can　be　called　Force；　but　in　the　sense　not　of　repressed　force　＇spoken　of　above＇；
but　force　in　general；　or　the　concept　of　force；　an　abstraction　which　absorbs　the　distinctions　involved
in　what　attracts　and　is　attracted。　In　this　sense；　e。g。；　simple　electricity　is　force；　the　expression　of
difference　falls；　however；　within　the　law；　this　difference　is　positive　and　negative　electricity。　In　the
case　of　the　motion　of　falling　bodies　force　is　the　simple　element；　gravity；　which　has　the　law　that　the
magnitudes　of　the　different　factors　in　the　motion；　the　time　spent；　and　the　space　traversed；　are　to
one　another　in　the　relation　of　root　and　square。　Electricity　itself　is　not　difference　per　se；　is　not　in　its
essential　nature。　a　twofold　entity　consisting　of　positive　and　negative　electricity；　hence　it　is　often　said
it　has　the　law　of　being　so　and　so　in　the　way　indicated；　or　again；　that　it　has　the　property　of
expressing　itself　in　this　fashion。　This　property　is　doubtless　the　essential　and　peculiar　property　of　this
force；　i。e。　it　belongs　to　it　necessarily。　But　necessity　is　here　an　empty　phrase；　force　must；　just
because　it　must；　duplicate　itself　in　this　manner。　Of　course；　if　positive　electricity　is　given；　negative
electricity　is　inherently　necessary；　for　the　positive　element　only　is　by　being；　related　to　a　negative；　in
other　words；　the　positive　element　in　its　very　self　involves　difference　from　itself；　just　in　the　same
way　as　the　negative　does。　But　that　electricity　as　such　should　break　itself　up　into　parts　in　this　way
—　this　is　not　in　itself　a　necessity。　Electricity　qua　simple　force　is　indifferent　to　its　law　—　to　be　in　the
form　of　positive　and　negative；　and　if　we　call　the　former　its　notion　and　the　latter　its　being；　then　its
notion　is　indifferent　to　its　being；　it　merely　has　this　as　a　property；　which　just　means　that　this　is　not
per　se　necessary　to　it。　This　indifference　takes　another　form　when　it　is　said　that　to　be　positive　and
negative　is　involved　in　the　definition　of　electricity；　or　that　this　is　neither　more　nor　less　than　its　notion
and　its　essence。　Its　being　in　that　case　would　mean　its　existence　in　general。　But　in　that　definition　the
necessity　of　its　existence　is　not　contained；　it　exists　either　because　we　find　it；　i。e。　its　existence　is　not
necessary　at　all；　or　else　it　exists　through　other　forces；　i。e。　the　necessity　of　its　existence　is　an
external　necessity。　But　in　that　the　determinateness　of　being　through　another　is　what　the　necessity
consists　in；　we　are　back　again　to　the　plurality　of　determinate　laws；　which　we　have　just　left　in　order
to　consider　law；　as　law。　It　is　only　with　the　latter　that　we　can　compare　its　notion　as　notion；　or　its
necessity。　This　necessity；　however；　has　in　all　these　forms　shown　itself　to　be　just　an　empty　phrase。

There　is　still　another　way　than　that　just　indicated　in　which　the　indifference　of　law　and　force；　or　of
notion　and　being；　is　found。　In　the　law　of　motion；　e。g。；　it　is　necessary　for　motion　to　be　broken　up
into　the　elements　time　and　space；　or　again；　into　distance　and　velocity。　Since　motion　is　merely　the
relation　of　these　f　actors；　motion；　the　universal；　has　in　this　way　certainly　distinct　parts　in　its　own
self。　But　now　these　parts；　time　and　space；　or　distance　and　velocity；　do　not　express　in　themselves
this　origination　from　a　single　unity。　They　are　indifferent　the　one　to　the　other。　Space　is　thought　of　as
able　to　be　without。　time；　time　without　space；　and　distance　at　least　without　velocity　—　just　as　their
magnitudes　are　indifferent　the　one　to　the　other；　since　they　are　not　related　like　positive　and　negative；
and　consequently　do　not　refer　to　one　another　by　their　very　nature。　The　necessity　of　partition　into
distinct　factors；　then；　we　certainly　do　have　here；　but　not　the　necessity　of　the　parts　as　such　for　one
another。　On　that　account；　however；　that　first　necessity　too　is　itself　a　merely　delusory　false
necessity。　For　motion　is　not　itself　thought　of　as　something　simple　or　as　bare　essence；　but　as；　from
the　first；　divided　into　elements；　time　and　space　are　in　themselves　its　independent　parts　or　its　real
elements：　in　other　words；　distance　and　velocity　are　modes　of　being；　or　ways　of　thinking；　each　of
which　can　very　well　be　without　the　other；　and　motion　is　consequently　no　more　than　their　superficial
relation；　not　their　true　nature。　If　it　is　represented　as　simple　essence　or　as　force；　motion　is　no　doubt
gravity；　but　this　does　not　contain　these　distinctions　at　all。

The　distinction　is；　then；　in　both　cases　no　distinction　of　an　inherent　or　essential　kind。　Either　the
universal；　force；　is　indifferent　to　the　division　into　parts；　which　is　found　in　the　law；　or　else　the
distinctions；　the　parts　of　the　law；　are　indifferent　to　one　another。　Understanding；　however；　does
have　the　notion　of　this　distinction　per　se；　just　by　the　fact　that　law　is　in　part　the　inner　being；　the
inherent　nature；　but　is　at　the　same　time　something　distinguished　within　the　notion。　That　this
distinction　is　thereby　inner　distinction　is　shown　by　the　fact　that　law　is　bare　and　simple　force；　or　is
the　notion　of　that　distinction；　and　thus　is　a　distinction　of　the　notion。　But　still　this　inner　distinction　falls
to　begin　with　only　within　understanding；　and　is　not　yet　established　in　the　fact　itself。　It　is　thus　only　its
own　necessity　to　which　understanding　gives　expression　—　the　distinction；　that　is　to　say；　is　one
which　it　makes　only　so　as　at　the　same　time　to　express　that　the　distinction　is　not　to　be　a　distinction
in　the　nature　of　the　fact　itself。　This　necessity；　which　is　merely　verbal；　is　thus　a　rehearsal　of　the
moments　which　make　up　the　cycle　of　necessity。　They　are　no　doubt　distinct；　but　their　distinction　is
at　the　same　time　explicitly　stated　to　be　not　a　distinction　of　the　fact　itself；　and　consequently　is　itself
again　straightway　cancelled　and　transcended。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（3）　Explanation

This　process　is　called　Explanation。　A　law　is　expressed；　from　this　its　inherently　universal　element
or　ground　is　distinguished　as　force；　but　regarding　this　distinction；　it　is　asserted　that　it　is　no
distinction；　rather　that　the　ground　has　entirely　the　same　constitution　as　the　law。　For　example；　the
particular　occurrence　of　lightning　is　apprehended　as　universal；　and　this　universal　is　expressed　as
the　law　of　electricity；　the　explanation　thereupon　merges　the　law　in　force　as　the　essence　of　the　law。
This　force　is；　then；　so　constituted　that；　when　it　finds　expression；　opposite　electrical　discharges
appear；　and　these　again　disappear　into　one　another。　In　other　words；　force　has　exactly　the　same
constitution　as　law；　both　are　thus　declared　to　be　in　no　way　distinct。　The　distinctions　are　pure
universal　expression　or　law　and　pure　force；　but　both　have　the　same　content；　the　same　constitutive
character；　thus　the　distinction　between　them　qua　distinction　of　content；　i。e。　of　fact；　is　also　again
withdrawn。

In　this　tautological　process　understanding；　as　the　above　shows；　holds　fast　to　the　changeless　unity
of　its　object；　and　the　process　takes　effect　solely　within　understanding　itself；　not　in　the　object。　It　is
an　explanation　that　not　only　explains　nothing；　but　is　so　plain　that；　while　it　makes　as　if　it　would　say
something　different　from　what　is　already　said；　it　really　says　nothing