phenomenology of mind-第47部分
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concrete actuality。
1。 v。 p。 154 ff。
a （1）
Observation of Nature
WHEN the unreflective consciousness speaks of observation and experience as being the fountain
of truth； the phrase may possibly sound as if the whole business were a matter of tasting； smelling；
feeling； hearing； and seeing。 It forgets； in its zeal for tasting； smelling； etc。； to say that； in point of
fact； it has really and rationally determined for itself already the object thus sensuously
apprehended； and this determination of the object is at least as important for it as that
apprehension。 It will also as readily admit that its whole concern is not simply a matter of
perceiving； and will not allow； e。g；。 the perception that this penknife lies beside this snuff…box to
pass for an 〃observation〃。 What is perceived should； at least； have the significance of a universal；
and not of a sensuous particular 〃this〃。
The universal； here regarded； is； only in the first instance； what remains identical with itself； its
movement is merely the uniform recurrence of the same operation。 The consciousness； which thus
far finds in the object merely universality or the abstract 〃mine〃； must take upon itself the
movement peculiar to the object； and； since it is not yet at the stage of understanding that object； it
must； at least； be the recollection of it； a recollection which expresses in a universal way what； in
actual fact； is merely present in a particular form。 This superficial way of educing from particularity；
and the equally superficial form of universality into which the sense element is merely taken up；
without the sense element having in itself become a universalthis description of things is not as yet
a process effected in the object itself。 The process really takes place solely in the function of
describing。 The object as it is described has consequently lost interest； when one object is being
described another must be taken in hand and ever sought； so as not to put a stop to the process of
description。 If it is no longer easy to find new and whole things； then there is nothing for it but to
turn back upon those already found； in order to divide them still further； break them up into
component parts and look out for any new aspects of thinghood that still remain in them。 There
can never be an end to the material at the disposal of this restlessly active instinct。 To find a new
genus of distinctive significance； or even to discover a new planet； which although an individual
entity yet possesses the nature of a universal； can only fall to the lot of those who are lucky
enough。 But the boundary line of what； like elephant； oak； gold； is markedly distinctive； the line of
demarcation of what is genus and species passes through many stages into the endless
particularization of the chaos of plants and animals； kinds of rocks； or of metals； forms of earth；
etc。； etc。； that only force and craft can bring to light。 In this realm where universality means
indeterminateness； where particularity now approximates to singleness； and again at this point and
that even descends to it entirely； there is offered an inexhaustible supply of material for observation
and description to deal with。 Here； where a boundless field is opened up； at the boundary line of
the universal it can have found not an immeasurable wealth； but instead； merely the limitations of
nature and of its own operation。 It can no longer know whether what seems to have being per se
is not a chance accident。 What bears the impress of a confused or immature feeble structure；
barely evolving from the stage of elementary indeterminateness； cannot claim even to be
described。
While this seeking and describing seem to be concerned merely with things； we see that in point of
fact it does not continue in the form of sense…perception。 Rather； what enables things to be known
is more important for description than the range of sense properties still left over； qualities which；
of course； the thing itself cannot do without； but which consciousness dispenses with。 Through this
distinction into what is essential and what is unessential； the notion rises out of the dispersion of
sensibility； and knowledge thereby makes it clear that it has to do at least quite as essentially with
its own self as with things。 This twofold essentiality produces a certain hesitation as to whether
what is essential and necessary for knowledge is also so in the case of the things。 On the one hand；
the qualifying 〃marks〃 have merely to serve the purpose of knowledge in distinguishing things inter
se； on the other hand； however； it is not the unessential quality of things that has to be known； but
that feature in virtue of which they themselves break away from the general continuity of being as a
whole； separate themselves from others and stand by themselves。 The distinguishing 〃marks〃 must
not only have an essential relation to knowledge but also be the essential characteristics of the
things； and the system of marks devised must conform to the system of nature itself； and merely
express this system。 This follows necessarily from the very principle and meaning of reason； and
the instinct of reasonfor it operates in this process of observation merely as an instincthas also
in its systems attained this unity； a unity where its objects are so constituted that they carry their
own essential reality with them； involve an existence on their own account； and are not simply an
incident of a given particular time； or a particular place。 The distinguishing marks of animals； for
example； are taken from their claws and teeth； for； in point of fact； not only does knowledge
distinguish thus one animal from another； but each animal itself separates itself off thereby； it
preserves itself independently by means of these weapons； and keeps itself detached from the
universal nature。 A plant； on the other hand； never gets the length of existing for itself； it touches
merely the boundary line of individuality。 This line is where plants show the semblance of
diremption and separation by the possession of different sex…characters； this furnishes； therefore；
the principle for distinguishing plants inter se。 What； however； stands on a still lower level cannot
of itself any longer distinguish itself from another； it gets lost when the contrast comes into play。
Quiescent being and being in a relation come into conflict with one another； a 〃thing〃 in the latter
case is something different from a 〃thing〃 in the former state； whereas the 〃individuum〃 consists in
preserving itself in relation to another。 What； however； is incapable of this and becomes in
chemical fashion something other than it is empirically； confuses knowledge and gives rise to the
same doubt as to whether knowledge is to hold to the one side or the other； since the thing has
itself no self…consistency； and these two sides fall apart within it。
In those systems where the elements involve general self…sameness； this character connotes at
once the self…sameness of knowledge and of things themselves as well。 But this expansion of these
self…identical characteristics； each of which describes undisturbed the entire circuit of its course
and gets full scope to do as it likes； necessarily leads as readily to its very opposite； leads to the
confusion of these characteristics。 For the qualifying mark； the general characteristic is the unity of
opposite factors； viz。 of what is determinate； and of what is per se universal。 It must； therefore；
break asunder into this opposition。 If； now； on one side the characteristic overmasters the
universality in which its essence lies； on the other side； again； this universality equally keeps that
characteristic under control； forces the latter on to its boundary line； and there mingles together its
distinctions and its essential constituents。 Observation which kept them apart in orderly fashion；
and thought it had hold there of something stable and fixed； finds the principles overlapping and
dominating one another； sees confusions formed and transitions made from one to another； here it
finds united what it took at first to be absolutely separated； and there separated what it considered
connected。 Hence； when observation thus holds by the unbroken self…sameness of being； it has
here； just in the most general determinations given…e。g。 in the case of the essential marks of an
animal or a plant…to see itself tormented with instances； which rob it of every determination； silence
the universality it reached； and reduce it again to unreflective observation and description。
Observation； which confines itself in this way to what is simple； or restricts the sensuously
dispersed elements by the universal； thus finds its principle confused by its object； because what is
determined must by its very nature get lost in its opposite。 Reason； therefore； must pass from that
inert characteristic which had the semblance of stability； and go on to observe it as it really is in
truth； viz。 as relating itself to its opposite。 What are called essential marks are passive
characteristics； which； when expressed and apprehended as simple； do not bring out what
constitutes their real naturewhich is to be vanishing moments of its process of withdrawing and
betaking itself into itself。 Since the instinct of reason now arrives at the point of looking for the
characteristic in the light of its true naturethat of essentially passing over into its opposite and not
existing apart by itself and for its own sakeit seeks after the Law and the notion of law。 It seeks
for them； moreover； as existing reality； but this feature of concrete reality will in point of fact
disappear before reason； and the aspects of the law will become for it mere moments or
abstractions； so that the law comes to light in the nature of the notion； which has destroyed within
itself the indifferent subsistence of sensuous reality。
To the consciousness observing； the truth of the law is given in 〃experience〃； in the way that sense
existence is object for consciousness； the truth is not given in and itself。 If； however； the law does
not have its truth for in the notion； it is somet
