phenomenology of mind-第58部分

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From　this　peculiarity；　that　the　organ　of　activity　is　at　once　a　form　of　being　and　the　operation　going
on　within　it；　or　again　that　the　inner　inherent　being　is　itself　explicitly　present　in　it　and　has　a　being　for
others；　we　come　upon　a　further　aspect　of　it　different　from　the　preceding。　For　if　the　organs　in
general　proved　to　be　incapable　of　being　taken　as　expressions　of　the　inner　for　the　reason　that　in
them　the　action　is　present　as　a　process；　while　the　action　as　a　deed　or　（finished）　act　is　merely
external；　and　inner　and　outer　in　this　way　fall　apart　and　are　or　can　be　alien　to　one　another；　the　organ
must；　in　view　of　the　peculiarity　now　considered；　be　again　taken　as　also　a　middle　term　for　both；
since　this　very　fact；　that　the　operation　takes　place　and　is　present　in　it；　constitutes　eo　ipso　an
external　attribute　of　it；　and　indeed　one　that　is　different　from　the　deed　or　act；　for　the　former　holds
by　the　individual　and　remains　with　him。

This　mediating　term　uniting　inner　and　outer　is　in　the　first　place　itself　external　too。　But　then　this
externality　is　at　the　same　time　taken　up　into　the　inner；　it　stands　in　the　form　of　simple　unbroken
externality　opposed　to　dispersed　externality；　which　either　is　a　single　performance　or　condition
contingent　for　the　individuality　as　a　whole；　or　else；　in　the　form　of　a　total　externality；　is　fate　or
destiny；　split　up　into　a　plurality　of　performances　and　conditions。　The　simple　lines　of　the　hand；　then；
the　ring　and　compass　of　the　voice；　as　also　the　individual　peculiarity　of　the　language　used：　or　again
this　idiosyncracy　of　language；　as　expressed　where　the　hand　gives　it　more　durable　existence　than
the　voice　can　do；　viz。　in　writing；　especially　in　the　particular　style　of　〃handwriting〃　—　all　this　is　an
expression　of　the　inner；　so　that；　as　against　the　multifarious　externality　of　action　and　fate；　this
expression　again　stands　in　the　position　of　simple　externality；　plays　the　part　of　an　inner　in　relation　to
the　externality　of　action　and　fate。　Thus；　then；　if　at　first　the　specific　nature　and　innate　peculiarity　of
the　individual　along　with　what　these　become　as　the　result　of　cultivation　and　development；　are
regarded　as　the　inner　reality；　as　the　essence　of　action　and　of　fate；　this　inner　being　finds　its
appearance　in　external　fashion　to　begin　with　in　his　mouth；　hand；　voice；　handwriting；　and　the　other
organs　and　their　permanent　characteristics。　Thereafter　and　not　till　then　does　it　give　itself　further
outward　expression　in　its　realization　in　the　world。

Now　because　this　middle　term　assumes　the　nature　of　an　outer　expression；　which　is　at　the　same
time　taken　back　into　the　inner；　its　existence　is　not　confined　to　the　immediate　organ　of　action　（the
hand）；　this　middle　term　is　rather　the　movement　and　form　of　countenance　and　figure　in　general
which　perform　no　outward　act。　These　lineaments　and　their　movements　on　this　principle　are　the
checked　and　restrained　action　that　stops　in　the　individual　and；　as　regards　his　relation　to　what　he
actually　does；　constitute　his　own　personal　inspection　and　observation　of　the　action…outer
expression　in　the　sense　of　reflexion　upon　the　actual　outer　expression。

The　individual；　on　the　occasion　of　his　external　action；　is　therefore　not　dumb　and　silent；　because　he
is　thereby　at　once　reflected　into　himself；　and　he　gives　articulate　expression　to　this　self…reflexion。
This　theoretical　action；　the　individual's　conversing　with　himself　on　the　matter；　is　also　perceptible　to
others；　for　his　speaking　is　itself　an　outer　expression。

In　this　inner；　then；　which　in　being　expressed　remains　an　inner；　observation　finds　the　individual
reflected　out　of　his　actual　reality；　and　we　have　to　see　how　the　case　stands　with　regard　to　the
necessity　which　lies　in　the　unity　here。

His　being　thus　reflected　is　to　begin　with　different　from　the　act　itself；　and　therefore　can　be；　and　be
taken　for　something　other　than　the　deed　is。　We　look　at　a　man's　face　and　see　whether　he　is　in
earnest　with　what　he　says　or　does。　Conversely；　however；　what　is　here　intended　to　be　an
expression　of　the　inner　is　at　the　same　time　an　existent　objective　expression；　and　hence　itself　falls　to
the　level　of　mere　existence；　which　is　absolutely　contingent　for　the　self…conscious　individual。　It　is
therefore　no　doubt　an　expression；　but　at　the　same　time　only　in　the　sense　of　a　sign；　so　that　to　the
content　expressed　the　peculiar　nature　of　that　by　which　it　is　expressed　is　completely　indifferent。　The
inner　in　thus　appearing　is　doubtless　an　invisible　made　visible；　but　without　being　itself　united　to　this
appearance。　It　can　just　as　well　make　use　of　some　other　appearance　as　another　inner　can　adopt　the
same　appearance。　Lichtenberg；　（2）　therefore；　is　right　in　saying：　〃Suppose　the　physiognomist　ever
did　have　a　man　in　his　grasp；　it　would　merely　require　a　courageous　resolution　on　the　man's　part　to
make　himself　again　incomprehensible　for　centuries。〃

In　the　previous　case　（3）　the　immediately　given　circumstances　formed　a　sphere　of　existence　from
which　individuality　selected　what　it　could　or　what　it　wanted；　either　submitting　to　or　transmuting　this
given　existence；　for　which　reason　this　did　not　contain　the　necessity　and　inner　nature　of　individuality。
Similarly　here　the　immediate　being　in　which　individuality　clothes　its　appearance　is　one　which　either
expresses　the　fact　of　its　being　reflected　back　out　of　reality　and　existing　within　itself；　or　which　is　for
it　merely　a　sign　indifferent　to　what　is　signified；　and　therefore　signifying　in　reality　nothing；　it　is　as
much　its　countenance　as　its　mask；　which　can　be　put　off　when　it　likes。　Individuality　permeates　its
own　shape；　moves；　speaks　in　the　shape　assumed；　but　this　entire　mode　of　existence　equally　well
passes　over　into　a　state　of　being　indifferent　to　the　will　and　the　act。　Individuality　effaces　from　it　the
significance　it　formerly　had　—　of　being　that　wherein　individuality　is　reflected　into　itself；　or　has　its
true　nature　—　and　instead　puts　its　real　nature　rather　in　the　will　and　the　deed。

Individuality　abandons　that　condition　of　being　reflected　into　self　which　finds　expression　in　lines　and
lineaments；　and　places　its　real　nature　in　the　work　done。　Herein　it　contradicts　the　relationship　which
the　instinct　of　reason；　engaged　in　observing　self…conscious　individuality；　establishes　in　regard　to
what　its　inner　and　outer　should　be。　This　point　of　view　brings　us　to　the　special　idea　at　the　basis　of
the　science　of　physiognomy…if　we　care　to　call　it　a　〃science〃。　The　opposition　this　form　of
observation　comes　upon　is　in　form　the　opposition　of　practical　and　theoretical；　both　falling　inside
the　practical　aspect　itself　—　the　opposition　of　individuality；　making　itself　real　in　action　（in　the　most
general　sense　of　action）；　and　individuality　as　being　in　this　action　at　the　same　time　reflected　thence
into　self；　and　taking　the　action　for　its　object。　Observation　apprehends　and　accepts　this　opposition
in　the　same　inverted　form　in　which　it　is　when　it　makes　its　appearance。　To　observation；　the　deed
itself　and　the　performance；　whether　it　be　that　of　speech　or　a　more　solid　reality；　stand　for　the
nonessential　outer；　while　the　individuality's　existence　within　itself　passes　for　the　essential　inner。　Of
the　two　aspects　which　the　practical　mind　involves；　intention　and　act　（the　〃meaning〃　regarding　the
action　and　the　action　itself）；　observation　selects　the　former　as　the　true　inner；　this　（i。e。　the　intention
or　true　inner）　is　supposed　to　have　its　more　or　less　unessential　externalization　in　the　act；　while　its
true　outer　expression　is　to　be　had　in　the　form　in　which　the　individual　is　embodied。　This　latter
expression　is　a　sensuous　immediate　presence　of　the　individual　mind：　the　inwardness；　which　is
intended　to　be　the　true　internal　aspect；　is　the　particular　point　of　the　intention；　and　the　singleness　of
self…existence：　both　together　the　mind　subjectively　〃meant〃　Thus；　what　observation　takes　for　its
objects　is　an　existence　that　is　〃meant〃；　and　within　this　sphere　it　looks　for　laws。

The　primary　way　of　making　conjectures　（meinen）　regarding　the　〃presumptive〃　presence　of　mind　is
everyday　（natürlich）　physiognomy；　hasty　judgment　formed　at　a　glance　about　the　inner　nature　and
the　character　of　its　outer　form　and　shape。　The　object　of　this　guesswork　thinking　（4）　is　of　such　a
kind　that　its　very　essence　involves　its　being　in　truth　something　else　than　merely　sensuous　and
immediate。　Certainly　what　is　really　present　is　just　this　condition　of　being　in　sensuous　form　reflected
out　of　sense　into　self；　it　is　the　visible　as　a　sensuous　presentment　of　the　invisible；　which　constitutes
the　object　of　observation。　But　this　very　sensuous　immediate　presence　is　the　mind's　reality〃　as　that
reality　is　approved　by　mere　conjecture　（Meinung）；　and　observation　from　this　point　of　view
occupies　itself　with　its　〃presumed〃　（gemeint）　existence；　with　physiognomy；　handwriting；　sound　of
voice；　etc。

Observation　relates　such　and　such　a　sensuous　fact　to　just　such　a　supposed　or　presumed
（gemeintes）　inner。　It　is　not　the　murderer；　the　thief；　that　is　to　be　known；　it　is　the　capacity　to　be　a
murderer；　a　thief。　The　definitely　marked　abstract　attribute　is　thereby　lost　in　the　concrete　indefinite
characteristic　nature　of　the　particular　individual；　which　now　demands　more　skilful　delineations　than
the　former　qualifications　supply。　Such　skilful　delineations　no　doubt　say　more　than　the　qualification；
〃murderer〃；　〃thief〃；　or　〃good…hearted〃；　〃unspoiled〃；　and　so　on；　but　are　a　long　way　short　of　their
aim；　which　is　to　express　the　being　that　is　〃meant〃；　the　single　individuality；　as　far　short　as　the
delineations　of　the　form　and　shape；　which　go　further　than　a　〃flat　brow〃；　a　〃long　nose〃；　etc。　For　the
individual　shape　and　form；　like　the　individual　self…consciousness；　is　qua　something　〃meant〃；
inexpressible。　The　〃science　of　knowing　men〃；　（5）　which　is　concerned　about　the　supposed　human
being；　like　the　〃science〃　of　physiognomy；　which　deals　with　his　presumed　reality　and　seeks　to　raise
to　the　level　of　knowledge　uncritical　assertions　of　everday　（natürlich）　physiognomy；　（6）　is　therefore
something　with　neither　foundation　nor　finality；　it　cannot　manage　to　say　what　it　〃means〃　because　it
merely　〃means〃；　and　its　content　is　merely　what　is　〃presumed〃　or　〃meant〃。

The　so…called　〃laws〃；　this　kind　of