phenomenology of mind-第75部分
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self…consciousness。 Here； however； the moments of actual self…consciousness — both so far as we
call them its content （purpose； action； and reality）； and also in so far as we call them its form
（being…for…self and being…for…another） — are made identical with the bare and simple category
itself； and the category is thereby at the same time the entire content。
1。 It is difficult to find a current English equivalent for this term （die Sache Selbst）。 〃Fact itself〃 or
〃actual fact〃 does not seem to convey much meaning。 It seems best to try to bring out the
significance implied； even though at the sacrifice of literal translation。
b
Reason as Lawgiver
SPIRITUAL essential reality is； in its bare existence； pure consciousness； and also this
self…consciousness。 The originally determinate nature of the individual has lost its positive
significance of being inherently the element and purpose of his activity； it is merely a superseded
moment； while the individual is a self in the sense of a universal self。 Conversely the formal 〃real
intent〃 gets its filling from active self…differentiating individuality； for the distinctions within
individuality compose the content of that universal。 The category is implicit （an sich） as the
universal of pure consciousness； it is also explicit （für sich）； for the self of consciousness is
likewise its moment。 It is absolute being； for that universality is the bare self…identity of being。
Thus what is object for consciousness has （now） the significance of being the true； it is and it holds
good； in the sense of being and holding good by itself as an independent entity （an und für sich
selbst）。 It is the 〃absolute fact〃； which no longer suffers from the opposition of certainty and its
truth； between universal and individual； between purpose and its reality； but whose existence is the
reality and action of self…consciousness。 This 〃fact〃 is therefore the ethical substance； and
consciousness of it is ethical consciousness。 Its object is likewise taken to be the truth； for it
combines self…consciousness and being in a single unity。 It stands for what is absolute； for
self…consciousness cannot and will not again go beyond this object because it is there at home with
itself： it cannot； for the object is all power； and all being： it will not； because the object is its self；
or the will of this self。 It is the real object inherently as object； for it contains and involves the
distinction which consciousness implies。 It divides itself into areas or spheres （Massen） which are
the determinate laws of the absolute reality ＇viz。 the ethical substance＇。 These spheres； however；
do not obscure the notion； for the moments （being； bare consciousness and self） are kept
contained within it — a unity which constitutes the inner nature of these spheres； and no longer lets
these moments in this distinction fall apart from one another。
These laws or spheres （Massen） of the substance of ethical life are directly recognized and
acknowledged。 We cannot ask for their origin and justification； nor is there something else to
search for as their warrant； for something other than this independent self…subsistent reality （an
und für sich seyendes Wesen） could only be self…consciousness itself。 But self…consciousness is
nothing else than this reality； for itself is the self…existence of this reality； which is the truth just
because it is as much the self of consciousness as its inherent nature （sein Ansich）； or pure
consciousness。
Since self…consciousness knows itself to be a moment of this substance； the moment of
self…existence （of independence and self…determination）； it expresses the existence of the law
within itself in the form： 〃the healthy natural reason knows immediately what is right and good〃。 As
healthy reason knows the law immediately； so the law is valid for it also immediately； and it says
directly： 〃this is right and good〃。 The emphasis is on 〃this〃： there are determinate specific laws；
there is the 〃fact itself 〃 with a concrete filling and content。
What is thus given immediately must likewise be accepted and regarded as immediate。 As in the
case of the immediacy of sense…experience； so here we have also to consider the nature of the
existence to which this immediate certainty in ethical experience gives expression — to analyse the
constitution of the immediately existing areas （Massen） of ethical reality。 Examples of some such
laws will show what we want to know； and since we take them in the form of declarations of the
healthy reason knowing them； we； have not； in this connexion； to introduce the moment which has
to be made good in their case when looked at as immediate ethical laws。
〃Every one ought to speak the truth。〃 In this duty； as expressed unconditionally； the condition will
at once be granted； viz。 if he knows the truth。 The command will therefore now run： everyone
should speak the truth； at all times according to his knowledge and conviction about it。 The healthy
reason； this very ethical consciousness which knows immediately what is right and good； will
explain that this condition had all the while been so bound up with that universal maxim that it
meant the command to be taken in that sense。 It thereby admits； however； in point of fact； that in
the very expression of the maxim it eo ipso really violated it。 The healthy reason said： 〃each should
speak the truth〃； it intended； however： 〃he must speak the truth according to his knowledge and
conviction〃。 That is to say； it spoke otherwise than it intended； and to speak otherwise than one
intends means not speaking the truth。 The improved untruth； or inaptitude now takes the form：
〃each must speak the truth according to his knowledge and conviction about it on each occasion〃。
Thereby； however； what was universally necessary and absolutely valid （and this the proposition
wanted to express） has turned round into what is really a complete contingency。 For speaking the
truth is left to the chance whether I know it and can convince myself of it； and there is nothing
more in the statement than that truth and falsehood are to be spoken； just as anyone happens to
know； intend； and understand。 This contingency in the content has universality merely in the
propositional form of the expression； but as an ethical maxim the proposition promises a universal
and necessary content； and thus contradicts itself by the content being contingent。 Finally； if the
maxim were to be improved by saying that the contingency of the knowledge and the conviction as
to the truth should be dropped； and that the truth； too； 〃ought〃 to be known； then this would be a
command which contradicts straightway what we started from。 Healthy reason was at first
assumed to have the immediate capacity of expressing the truth； now； however； we are saying that
it 〃ought〃 to know the truth； i。e。 that it does not immediately know how to express the truth。
Looking at the content； this has dropped out in the demand that we 〃should〃 know the truth； for
this demand refers to knowing in general — 〃we ought to know〃。 What is demanded is； therefore；
strictly speaking； something independent of every specific content。 But here the whole point of the
statement concerned a definite content； a distinction involved in the substance of the ethical life。
Yet this immediate determination of that substance is a content of such a kind as turned out really
to be a complete contingency； and when we try to get the required universality and necessity by
making the law refer to the knowledge ＇instead of to the content＇； then the content really
disappears altogether。
Another celebrated command runs： 〃Love thy neighbour as thyself。〃 It is directed to an individual
standing in relation to another individual； and asserts this law as a relation of a particular individual
to a particular individual； i。e。 a relation of sentiment or feeling （Empfindung）。 Active love — for an
inactive love has no existence； and is therefore doubtless not intended here（1） — aims at removing
evil from someone and bringing him good。 To do this we have to distinguish what the evil is； what
is the appropriate good to meet this evil； and what in general his well…being consists in； i。e。 we
have to love him intelligently。 Unintelligent love will do him harm perhaps more than hatred。
Intelligent； veritable （wesentlich） well…doing is； however； in its richest and most important form the
intelligent universal action of the state — an action compared with which the action of a particular
individual as such is something altogether so trifling that it is hardly worth talking about。 The action
of the state is in this connexion of such great weight and strength that if the action of the individual
were to oppose it； and either sought to be straightway and deliberately （für sich） criminal； or out
of love for another wanted to cheat the universal out of the right and claim which it has upon him；
such action would be useless and would inevitably be annihilated。 Hence all that well…doing； which
lies in sentiment and feeling； can mean is an action wholly and solely particular； a help at need；
which is as contingent as it is momentary。 Chance determines not merely its occasion； but also
whether it is a 〃work〃 at all； whether it is not at once dissipated again； and whether it does not
itself really turn to evil。 Thus this sort of action for the good of others； which is given out as
necessary； is so constituted that it may just as likely not exist as exist； is such that if the occasion
by chance arises； it may possibly be a 〃work〃； may possibly be good； but just as likely may not。
This law； therefore； has as little of a universal content as the first above considered； and fails to
express anything substantial； something objectively real per se （an und für sich）； which it should
do if it is to be an absolute ethical law。 In other words； such laws never get further than the 〃ought
to be〃； they have no actual reality； they are not laws； but merely commands。
It is； however； in point of fact； clear from the very nature of the case that we must renounce all
claim to an absolute universal content。 F
