second treatise of government-第20部分

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ecutive　and　federative；　

though　they　be　really　distinct　in　themselves；　yet　one　　comprehending　the　execution　of　the　municipal　laws　of　the　society　　within　its　self；　upon　all　that　are　parts　of　it；　the　other　the　　management　of　the　security　and　interest　of　the　public　without；　　with　all　those　that　it　may　receive　benefit　or　damage　from；　yet　　they　are　always　almost　united。　　And　though　this　federative　power　　in　the　well　or　ill　management　of　it　be　of　great　moment　to　the　　common…wealth；　yet　it　is　much　less　capable　to　be　directed　by　　antecedent；　standing；　positive　laws；　than　the　executive；　and　so　　must　necessarily　be　left　to　the　prudence　and　wisdom　of　those；　　whose　hands　it　is　in；　to　be　managed　for　the　public　good：　for　the　　laws　that　concern　subjects　one　amongst　another；　being　to　direct　　their　actions；　may　well　enough　precede　them。　　But　what　is　to　be　　done　in　reference　to　foreigners；　depending　much　upon　their　　actions；　and　the　variation　of　designs　and　interests；　must　be　left　　in　great　part　to　the　prudence　of　those；　who　have　this　power　　committed　to　them；　to　be　managed　by　the　best　of　their　skill；　for　　the　advantage　of　the　common…wealth。　　　　　　Sec。　148。　　Though；　as　I　said；　the　executive　and　federative　　power　of　every　community　be　really　distinct　in　themselves；　yet　　they　are　hardly　to　be　separated；　and　placed　at　the　same　time；　in　　the　hands　of　distinct　persons：　for　both　of　them　requiring　the　　force　of　the　society　for　their　exercise；　it　is　almost　　impracticable　to　place　the　force　of　the　common…wealth　in　　distinct；　and　not　subordinate　hands；　or　that　the　executive　and　　federative　power　should　be　placed　in　persons；　that　might　act　　separately；　whereby　the　force　of　the　public　would　be　under　　different　commands：　which　would　be　apt　some　time　or　other　to　　cause　disorder　and　ruin。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　C　H　A　P。　　X　I　I　I。

　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Subordination　of　the　Powers　of　the　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Common…wealth。

　　　　　Sec。　149。　　THOUGH　in　a　constituted　common…wealth；　standing　　upon　its　own　basis；　and　acting　according　to　its　own　nature；　that　　is；　acting　for　the　preservation　of　the　community；　there　can　be　　but　one　supreme　power；　which　is　the　legislative；　to　which　all　the　　rest　are　and　must　be　subordinate；　yet　the　legislative　being　only　　a　fiduciary　power　to　act　for　certain　ends；　there　remains　still　in　　the　people　a　supreme　power　to　remove　or　alter　the　legislative；　　when　they　find　the　legislative　act　contrary　to　the　trust　reposed　　in　them：　for　all　power　given　with　trust　for　the　attaining　an　end；　　being　limited　by　that　end；　whenever　that　end　is　manifestly　　neglected；　or　opposed；　the　trust　must　necessarily　be　forfeited；　　and　the　power　devolve　into　the　hands　of　those　that　gave　it；　who　　may　place　it　anew　where　they　shall　think　best　for　their　safety　　and　security。　　And　thus　the　community　perpetually　retains　a　　supreme　power　of　saving　themselves　from　the　attempts　and　designs　　of　any　body；　even　of　their　legislators；　whenever　they　shall　be　so　　foolish；　or　so　wicked；　as　to　lay　and　carry　on　designs　against　the　　liberties　and　properties　of　the　subject：　for　no　man　or　society　of　　men；　having　a　power　to　deliver　up　their　preservation；　or　　consequently　the　means　of　it；　to　the　absolute　will　and　arbitrary　　dominion　of　another；　when　ever　any　one　shall　go　about　to　bring　　them　into　such　a　slavish　condition；　they　will　always　have　a　right　　to　preserve；　what　they　have　not　a　power　to　part　with；　and　to　rid　　themselves　of　those；　who　invade　this　fundamental；　sacred；　and　　unalterable　law　of　self…preservation；　for　which　they　entered　into　　society。　　And　thus　the　community　may　be　said　in　this　respect　to　　be　always　the　supreme　power；　but　not　as　considered　under　any　form　　of　government；　because　this　power　of　the　people　can　never　take　　place　till　the　government　be　dissolved。

　　　　　Sec。　150。　　In　all　cases；　whilst　the　government　subsists；　the　　legislative　is　the　supreme　power：　for　what　can　give　laws　to　　another；　must　needs　be　superior　to　him；　and　since　the　legislative　　is　no　otherwise　legislative　of　the　society；　but　by　the　right　it　　has　to　make　laws　for　all　the　parts；　and　for　every　member　of　the　　society；　prescribing　rules　to　their　actions；　and　giving　power　of　　execution；　where　they　are　transgressed；　the　legislative　must　　needs　be　the　supreme；　and　all　other　powers；　in　any　members　or　　parts　of　the　society；　derived　from　and　subordinate　to　it。　　　　　　Sec。　151。　　In　some　commonwealths；　where　the　legislative　is　　not　always　in　being；　and　the　executive　is　vested　in　a　single　　person；　who　has　also　a　share　in　the　legislative；　there　that　　single　person　in　a　very　tolerable　sense　may　also　be　called　　supreme：　not　that　he　has　in　himself　all　the　supreme　power；　which　　is　that　of　law…making；　but　because　he　has　in　him　the　supreme　　execution；　from　whom　all　inferior　magistrates　derive　all　their　　several　subordinate　powers；　or　at　least　the　greatest　part　of　　them：　having　also　no　legislative　superior　to　him；　there　being　no　　law　to　be　made　without　his　consent；　which　cannot　be　expected　　should　ever　subject　him　to　the　other　part　of　the　legislative；　he　　is　properly　enough　in　this　sense　supreme。　　But　yet　it　is　to　be　　observed；　that　tho'　oaths　of　allegiance　and　fealty　are　taken　to　　him；　it　is　not　to　him　as　supreme　legislator；　but　as　supreme　　executor　of　the　law；　made　by　a　joint　power　of　him　with　others；　　allegiance　being　nothing　but　an　obedience　according　to　law；　which　　when　he　violates；　he　has　no　right　to　obedience；　nor　can　claim　it　　otherwise　than　as　the　public　person　vested　with　the　power　of　the　　law；　and　so　is　to　be　considered　as　the　image；　phantom；　or　　representative　of　the　common…wealth；　acted　by　the　will　of　the　　society；　declared　in　its　laws；　and　thus　he　has　no　will；　no　power；　　but　that　of　the　law。　　But　when　he　quits　this　representation；　this　　public　will；　and　acts　by　his　own　private　will；　he　degrades　　himself；　and　is　but　a　single　private　person　without　power；　and　　without　will；　that　has　any　right　to　obedience；　the　members　owing　　no　obedience　but　to　the　public　will　of　the　society。　　　　　　Sec。　152。　　The　executive　power；　placed　any　where　but　in　a　　person　that　has　also　a　share　in　the　legislative；　is　visibly　　subordinate　and　accountable　to　it；　and　may　be　at　pleasure　changed　　and　displaced；　so　that　it　is　not　the　supreme　executive　power；　　that　is　exempt　from　subordination；　but　the　supreme　executive　　power　vested　in　one；　who　having　a　share　in　the　legislative；　has　　no　distinct　superior　legislative　to　be　subordinate　and　　accountable　to；　farther　than　he　himself　shall　join　and　consent；　　so　that　he　is　no　more　subordinate　than　he　himself　shall　think　　fit；　which　one　may　certainly　conclude　will　be　but　very　little。　　　Of　other　ministerial　and　subordinate　powers　in　a　commonwealth；　we　　need　not　speak；　they　being　so　multiplied　with　infinite　variety；　　in　the　different　customs　and　constitutions　of　distinct　　commonwealths；　that　it　is　impossible　to　give　a　particular　account　　of　them　all。　　Only　thus　much；　which　is　necessary　to　our　present　　purpose；　we　may　take　notice　of　concerning　them；　that　they　have　no　　manner　of　authority；　any　of　them；　beyond　what　is　by　positive　　grant　and　commission　delegated　to　them；　and　are　all　of　them　　accountable　to　some　other　power　in　the　common…wealth。　　　　　　Sec。　153。　　It　is　not　necessary；　no；　nor　so　much　as　　convenient；　that　the　legislative　should　be　always　in　being；　but　　absolutely　necessary　that　the　executive　power　should；　because　　there　is　not　always　need　of　new　laws　to　be　made；　but　always　need　　of　execution　of　the　laws　that　are　made。　　When　the　legislative　　hath　put　the　execution　of　the　laws；　they　make；　into　other　hands；　　they　have　a　power　still　to　resume　it　out　of　those　hands；　when　　they　find　cause；　and　to　punish　for　any　maladministration　against　　the　laws。　　The　same　holds　also　in　regard　of　the　federative　power；　　that　and　the　executive　being　both　ministerial　and　subordinate　to　　the　legislative；　which；　as　has　been　shewed；　in　a　constituted　　common…wealth　is　the　supreme。　　The　legislative　also　in　this　case　

being　supposed　to　consist　of　several　persons；　（for　if　it　be　a　　single　person；　it　cannot　but　be　always　in　being；　and　so　will；　as　　supreme；　naturally　have　the　supreme　executive　power；　together　　with　the　legislative）　may　assemble；　and　exercise　their　　legislature；　at　the　times　that　either　their　original　　constitution；　or　their　own　adjournment；　appoints；　or　when　they　　please；　if　neither　of　these　hath　appointed　any　time；　or　there　be　　no　other　way　prescribed　to　convoke　them：　for　the　supreme　power　　being　placed　in　them　by　the　people；　it　is　always　in　them；　and　　they　may　exercise　it　when　they　please；　unless　by　their　original　　constitution　they　are　limited　to　certain　seasons；　or　by　an　act　of　　their　supreme　power　they　have　adjourned　to　a　certain　time；　and　　when　that　time　comes；　they　have　a　right　to　assemble　and　act　　again。　　　　　　Sec。　154。　　If　the　legislative；　or　any　part　of　it；　be　made　up　　of　representatives　chosen　for　that　time　by　the　people；　which　　afterwards　return　into　the　ordinary　state　of　subjects；　and　have　　no　share　in　the　legislature　but　upon　a　new　choice；　this　power　of　　chusing　must　also　be　exercised　by　the　people；　either　at　certain　　appointed　seasons；　or　else　when　they　are　summoned　to　it；　and　in　　this　latter　case　'　the　power　of　convoking　the　legislative　is　　ordinarily　placed　in　the　executive；　and　has　one　of　these　two　　limitations　in　respect　of　time：　that　either　the　original　　constitution　requires　their　assembling　and　acting　at　certain　　intervals；　and　then　the　executive　power　does　nothing　but　　ministerially　issue　directions　for　their　electing　and　assembling；　　according　to　due　forms；　or　else　it　is　left　to　his　prudence　to　　call　them　by　new　elections；　when　the　occasions　or　exigencies　of　　the　public　require　the　amendment　of　old；　or　making　of　new　laws；　　or　the　redress　or　prevention　of　any　inconveniencies；　that　lie　on；　　or　threaten　the　people。　　　　　　Sec。　155。　　It　may　be　demanded　here；　What　if　the　executive　　power；　being　possessed　of　the　force　of　the　common…wealth；　shall　　make　use　of　that　force　to　hinder　the　meeting　and　acting　of　the　　legislative；　when　the　original　constitution；　or　the　public　　exigencies　require　it？　　I　say；　using　force　upon　the　people　　without　authority；　and　contrary　to　the　trust　put　in　him　that　does　　so；　is　a　state　of　war　with　the　people；　who　have　a　right　to　　reinstate　their　legislative　in　the　exercise　of　their