second treatise of government-第22部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


pon　all　persons　that　　may　come　in　their　way；　therefore　there　is　a　latitude　left　to　the　　executive　power；　to　do　many　things　of　choice　which　the　laws　do　　not　prescribe。　　　　　　　　　Sec。　161。　　This　power；　whilst　employed　for　the　benefit　of　　the　community；　and　suitably　to　the　trust　and　ends　of　the　　government；　is　undoubted　prerogative；　and　never　is　questioned：　　for　the　people　are　very　seldom　or　never　scrupulous　or　nice　in　the　　point；　they　are　far　from　examining　prerogative；　whilst　it　is　in　　any　tolerable　degree　employed　for　the　use　it　was　meant；　that　is；　　for　the　good　of　the　people；　and　not　manifestly　against　it：　but　if　　there　comes　to　be　a　question　between　the　executive　power　and　the　　people；　about　a　thing　claimed　as　a　prerogative；　the　tendency　of　　the　exercise　of　such　prerogative　to　the　good　or　hurt　of　the　　people；　will　easily　decide　that　question。　　　　　　　　　Sec。　162。　　It　is　easy　to　conceive；　that　in　the　infancy　of　　governments；　when　commonwealths　differed　little　from　families　in　　number　of　people；　they　differed　from　them　too　but　little　in　　number　of　laws：　and　the　governors；　being　as　the　fathers　of　them；　　watching　over　them　for　their　good；　the　government　was　almost　all　　prerogative。　　A　few　established　laws　served　the　turn；　and　the　　discretion　and　care　of　the　ruler　supplied　the　rest。　　But　when　　mistake　or　flattery　prevailed　with　weak　princes　to　make　use　of　　this　power　for　private　ends　of　their　own；　and　not　for　the　public　　good；　the　people　were　fain　by　express　laws　to　get　prerogative　　determined　in　those　points　wherein　they　found　disadvantage　from　　it：　and　thus　declared　limitations　of　prerogative　were　by　the　　people　found　necessary　in　cases　which　they　and　their　ancestors　　had　left；　in　the　utmost　latitude；　to　the　wisdom　of　those　princes　　who　made　no　other　but　a　right　use　of　it；　that　is；　for　the　good　of　　their　people。　　　　　　Sec。　163。　　And　therefore　they　have　a　very　wrong　notion　of　　government；　who　say；　that　the　people　have　encroached　upon　the　　prerogative；　when　they　have　got　any　part　of　it　to　be　defined　by　　positive　laws：　for　in　so　doing　they　have　not　pulled　from　the　　prince　any　thing　that　of　right　belonged　to　him；　but　only　　declared；　that　that　power　which　they　indefinitely　left　in　his　or　　his　ancestors　hands；　to　be　exercised　for　their　good；　was　not　a　　thing　which　they　intended　him　when　he　used　it　otherwise：　for　the　　end　of　government　being　the　good　of　the　community；　whatsoever　　alterations　are　made　in　it；　tending　to　that　end；　cannot　be　an　　encroachment　upon　any　body；　since　no　body　in　government　can　have　　a　right　tending　to　any　other　end：　and　those　only　are　　encroachments　which　prejudice　or　hinder　the　public　good。　　Those　　who　say　otherwise；　speak　as　if　the　prince　had　a　distinct　and　　separate　interest　from　the　good　of　the　community；　and　was　not　　made　for　it；　the　root　and　source　from　which　spring　almost　all　　those　evils　and　disorders　which　happen　in　kingly　governments。　　　And　indeed；　if　that　be　so；　the　people　under　his　government　are　　not　a　society　of　rational　creatures；　entered　into　a　community　for　　their　mutual　good；　they　are　not　such　as　have　set　rulers　over　　themselves；　to　guard；　and　promote　that　good；　but　are　to　be　looked　　on　as　an　herd　of　inferior　creatures　under　the　dominion　of　a　　master；　who　keeps　them　and　works　them　for　his　own　pleasure　or　　profit。　　If　men　were　so　void　of　reason；　and　brutish；　as　to　enter　　into　society　upon　such　terms；　prerogative　might　indeed　be；　what　　some　men　would　have　it；　an　arbitrary　power　to　do　things　hurtful　　to　the　people。　　　　　　Sec。　164。　　But　since　a　rational　creature　cannot　be　supposed；　

when　free；　to　put　himself　into　subjection　to　another；　for　his　own　　harm；　（though；　where　he　finds　a　good　and　wise　ruler；　he　may　not　　perhaps　think　it　either　necessary　or　useful　to　set　precise　bounds　　to　his　power　in　all　things）　prerogative　can　be　nothing　but　the　　people's　permitting　their　rulers　to　do　several　things；　of　their　　own　free　choice；　where　the　law　was　silent；　and　sometimes　too　　against　the　direct　letter　of　the　law；　for　the　public　good；　and　　their　acquiescing　in　it　when　so　done：　for　as　a　good　prince；　who　　is　mindful　of　the　trust　put　into　his　hands；　and　careful　of　the　　good　of　his　people；　cannot　have　too　much　prerogative；　that　is；　　power　to　do　good；　so　a　weak　and　ill　prince；　who　would　claim　that　　power　which　his　predecessors　exercised　without　the　direction　of　　the　law；　as　a　prerogative　belonging　to　him　by　right　of　his　　office；　which　he　may　exercise　at　his　pleasure；　to　make　or　promote　　an　interest　distinct　from　that　of　the　public；　gives　the　people　an　　occasion　to　claim　their　right；　and　limit　that　power；　which；　　whilst　it　was　exercised　for　their　good；　they　were　content　should　　be　tacitly　allowed。　　　　　　　　Sec。　165。　　And　therefore　he　that　will　　look　into　the　history　of　England；　will　find；　that　prerogative　was　　always　largest　in　the　hands　of　our　wisest　and　best　princes；　　because　the　people；　observing　the　whole　tendency　of　their　actions　　to　be　the　public　good；　contested　not　what　was　done　without　law　to　　that　end：　or；　if　any　human　frailty　or　mistake　（for　princes　are　　but　men；　made　as　others）　appeared　in　some　small　declinations　from　　that　end；　yet　'twas　visible；　the　main　of　their　conduct　tended　to　　nothing　but　the　care　of　the　public。　　The　people　therefore；　　finding　reason　to　be　satisfied　with　these　princes；　whenever　they　　acted　without；　or　contrary　to　the　letter　of　the　law；　acquiesced　　in　what　they　did；　and；　without　the　least　complaint；　let　them　　inlarge　their　prerogative　as　they　pleased；　judging　rightly；　that　　they　did　nothing　herein　to　the　prejudice　of　their　laws；　since　　they　acted　conformable　to　the　foundation　and　end　of　all　laws；　the　　public　good。　　　　　　Sec。　166。　　Such　god…like　princes　indeed　had　some　title　to　　arbitrary　power　by　that　argument；　that　would　prove　absolute　　monarchy　the　best　government；　as　that　which　God　himself　governs　　the　universe　by；　because　such　kings　partake　of　his　wisdom　and　　goodness。　　Upon　this　is　founded　that　saying；　That　the　reigns　of　　good　princes　have　been　always　most　dangerous　to　the　liberties　of　　their　people：　for　when　their　successors；　managing　the　government　　with　different　thoughts；　would　draw　the　actions　of　those　good　　rulers　into　precedent；　and　make　them　the　standard　of　their　　prerogative；　as　if　what　had　been　done　only　for　the　good　of　the　　people　was　a　right　in　them　to　do；　for　the　harm　of　the　people；　if　　they　so　pleased；　it　has　often　occasioned　contest；　and　sometimes　　public　disorders；　before　the　people　could　recover　their　original　　right；　and　get　that　to　be　declared　not　to　be　prerogative；　which　　truly　was　never　so；　since　it　is　impossible　that　any　body　in　the　　society　should　ever　have　a　right　to　do　the　people　harm；　though　it　　be　very　possible；　and　reasonable；　that　the　people　should　not　go　　about　to　set　any　bounds　to　the　prerogative　of　those　kings；　or　　rulers；　who　themselves　transgressed　not　the　bounds　of　the　public　　good：　for　prerogative　is　nothing　but　the　power　of　doing　public　　good　without　a　rule。　　　　　　　　　Sec。　167。　　The　power　of　calling　parliaments　in　England；　as　　to　precise　time；　place；　and　duration；　is　certainly　a　prerogative　　of　the　king；　but　still　with　this　trust；　that　it　shall　be　made　use　　of　for　the　good　of　the　nation；　as　the　exigencies　of　the　times；　　and　variety　of　occasions；　shall　require：　for　it　being　impossible　　to　foresee　which　should　always　be　the　fittest　place　for　them　to　　assemble　in；　and　what　the　best　season；　the　choice　of　these　was　　left　with　the　executive　power；　as　might　be　most　subservient　to　　the　public　good；　and　best　suit　the　ends　of　parliaments。　　　　　　Sec。　168。　　The　old　question　will　be　asked　in　this　matter　of　　prerogative；　But　who　shall　be　judge　when　this　power　is　made　a　　right　use　of　？　　1　answer：　between　an　executive　power　in　being；　

with　such　a　prerogative；　and　a　legislative　that　depends　upon　his　　will　for　their　convening；　there　can　be　no　judge　on　earth；　as　　there　can　be　none　between　the　legislative　and　the　people；　should　　either　the　executive；　or　the　legislative；　when　they　have　got　the　　power　in　their　hands；　design；　or　go　about　to　enslave　or　destroy　　them。　　The　people　have　no　other　remedy　in　this；　as　in　all　other　　cases　where　they　have　no　judge　on　earth；　but　to　appeal　to　heaven：　　for　the　rulers；　in　such　attempts；　exercising　a　power　the　people　　never　put　into　their　hands；　（who　can　never　be　supposed　to　consent　　that　any　body　should　rule　over　them　for　their　harm）　do　that　which　　they　have　not　a　right　to　do。　　And　where　the　body　of　the　people；　　or　any　single　man；　is　deprived　of　their　right；　or　is　under　the　　exercise　of　a　power　without　right；　and　have　no　appeal　on　earth；　　then　they　have　a　liberty　to　appeal　to　heaven；　whenever　they　judge　　the　cause　of　sufficient　moment。　　And　therefore；　though　the　people　　cannot　be　judge；　so　as　to　have；　by　the　constitution　of　that　　society；　any　superior　power；　to　determine　and　give　effective　　sentence　in　the　case；　yet　they　have；　by　a　law　antecedent　and　　paramount　to　all　positive　laws　of　men；　reserved　that　ultimate　　determination　to　themselves　which　belongs　to　all　mankind；　where　　there　lies　no　appeal　on　earth；　viz。　　to　judge；　whether　they　have　　just　cause　to　make　their　appeal　to　heaven。　　And　this　judgment　　they　cannot　part　with；　it　being　out　of　a　man's　power　so　to　submit　　himself　to　another；　as　to　give　him　a　liberty　to　destroy　him；　God　　and　nature　never　allowing　a　man　so　to　abandon　himself；　as　to　　neglect　his　own　preservation：　and　since　he　cannot　take　away　his　　own　life；　neither　can　he　give　another　power　to　take　it。　　Nor　let　　any　one　think；　this　lays　a　perpetual　foundation　for　disorder；　for　　this　operates　not；　till　the　inconveniency　is　so　great；　that　the　　majority　feel　it；　and　are　weary　of　it；　and　find　a　necessity　to　　have　it　amended。　　But　this　the　executive　power；　or　wise　princes；　　never　need　come　in　the　danger　of：　and　it　is　the　thing；　of　all　　others；　they　have　most　need　to　avoid；　as　of　all　others　the　most　　perilous。




　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　CHAP。　　XV。

　　　　　　　　Of　Paternal；　Political；　and　Despotical　Power；　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　considered　together。

　　　　　Sec。　169。　　THOUGH　I　have　had　occasion　to　speak　of　these　　separately　before；　yet　the　great　mistakes　of　late　about　　government；　having；　as　I　suppose；　arisen　from　confounding　these　　distinct　powers　one　with　another；　it　may　not；　perhaps；　be　amiss　　to　consider　them　here　together。　　　　　　Sec。　170。