personal memoirs-2-第6部分

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Waynesboro'　and　blow　up　the　railroad　bridge。　　Having　done　this；

Torbert；　as　he　returned；　was　to　drive　off　whatever　cattle　he　could

find；　destroy　all　forage　and　breadstuffs；　and　burn　the　mills。　　He

took　possession　of　Waynesboro'　in　due　time；　but　had　succeeded　in　only

partially　demolishing　the　railroad　bridge　when；　attacked　by　Pegram's

division　of　infantry　and　Wickham's　cavalry；　he　was　compelled　to　fall

back　to　Staunton。　　From　the　latter　place　he　retired　to　Bridgewater；

and　Spring　Hill；　on　the　way；　however；　fully　executing　his

instructions　regarding　the　destructLon　of　supplies。



While　Torbert　was　on　this　expedition；　Merritt　had　occupied　Port

Republic；　but　he　happened　to　get　there　the　very　day　that　Kershaw's

division　was　marching　from　Swift　Run　Gap　to　join　Early。　　By　accident

Kershaw　ran　into　Merritt　shortly　after　the　latter　had　gained　the

village。　　Kershaw's　four　infantry　brigades　attacked　at　once；　and

Merrit；　forced　out　of　Port　Republic；　fell　back　toward　Cross　Keys；　and

in　anticipation　that　the　Confederates　could　be　coaxed　to　that　point；

I　ordered　the　infantry　there；　but　Torbert's　attack　at　Wavnesboro'　had

alarmed　Early；　and　in　consequence　he　drew　all　his　forces　in　toward

Rock…fish　Gap。　　This　enabled　me　to　re…establish　Merritt　at　Port

Republic；　send　the　Sixth　and　Nineteenth　corps　to　the　neighborhood　of

Mt。　Crawford　to　await　the　return　of　Torbert；　and　to　post　Crook　at

Harrisonburg；　these　dispositions　practically　obtained　till　the　6th　of

October；　I　holding　a　line　across　the　valley　from　Port　Republic　along

North　River　by　Mt。　Crawford　to　the　Back　road　near　the　mouth　of　Briery

Branch　Gap。



It　was　during　this　period；　about　dusk　on　the　evening　of　October　3；

that　between　Harrisonburg　and　Dayton　my　engineer　officer；　Lieutenant

John　R。　Meigs；　was　murdered　within　my　lines。　　He　had　gone　out　with

two　topographical　assistants　to　plot　the　country；　and　late　in　the

evening；　while　riding　along　the　public　road　on　his　return　to　camp；　he

overtook　three　men　dressed　in　our　uniform。　　From　their　dress；　and

also　because　the　party　was　immediately　behind　our　lines　and　within　a

mile　and　a　half　of　my　headquarters；　Meigs　and　his　assistants

naturally　thought　that　they　were　joining　friends；　and　wholly

unsuspicious　of　anything　to　the　contrary；　rode　on　with　the　three　men

some　little　distance；　but　their　perfidy　was　abruptly　discovered　by

their　suddenly　turning　upon　Meigs　with　a　call　for　his　surrender。　　It

has　been　claimed　that；　refusing　to　submit；　he　fired　on　the

treacherous　party；　but　the　statement　is　not　true；　for　one　of　the

topographers　escapedthe　other　was　capturedand　reported　a　few

minutes　later　at　my　headquarters　that　Meigs　was　killed　without

resistance　of　any　kind　whatever；　and　without　even　the　chance　to　give

himself　up。　　This　man　was　so　cool；　and　related　all　the　circumstances

of　the　occurrence　with　such　exactness；　as　to　prove　the　truthfulness

of　his　statement。　　The　fact　that　the　murder　had　been　committed　inside

our　lines　was　evidence　that　the　perpetrators　of　the　crime；　having

their　homes　in　the　vicinity；　had　been　clandestinely　visiting　them；

and　been　secretly　harbored　by　some　of　the　neighboring　residents。

Determining　to　teach　a　lesson　to　these　abettors　of　the　foul　deeda

lesson　they　would　never　forgetI　ordered　all　the　houses　within　an

area　of　five　miles　to　be　burned。　　General　Custer；　who　had　succeeded

to　the　command　of　the　Third　Cavalry　division　（General　Wilson　having

been　detailed　as　chief　of　cavalry　to　Sherman's　army）；　was　charged

with　this　duty；　and　the　next　morning　proceeded　to　put　the　order　into

execution。　　The　prescribed　area　included　the　little　village　of

Dayton；　but　when　a　few　houses　in　the　immediate　neighborhood　of　the

scene　of　the　murder　had　been　burned；　Custer　was　directed　to　cease　his

desolating　work；　but　to　fetch　away　all　the　able…bodied　males　as

prisoners。









CHAPTER　III。



REASONS　FOR　NOT　PURSUING　EARLY　THROUGH　THE　BLUE　RIDGEGENERAL

TORBERT　DETAILED　TO　GIVE　GENERAL　ROSSER　A　〃DRUBBING〃GENERAL　ROSSER

ROUTEDTELEGRAPHED　TO　MEET　STANTONLONGSTREET'S　MESSAGERETURN　TO

WINCHESTERTHE　RIDE　TO　CEDAR　CREEKTHE　RETREATING　ARMYRALLYING

THE　TROOPSREFORMING　THE　LINECOMMENCING　THE　ATTACKDEFEAT　OF　THE

CONFEDERATESAPPOINTED　A　MAJOR…GENERAL　IN　THE　REGULAR　ARMYRESULTS

OF　THE　BATTLE。



While　we　lay　in　camp　at　Harrisonburg　it　became　necessary　to　decide

whether　or　not　I　would　advance　to　Brown's　Gap；　and；　after　driving　the

enemy　from　there；　follow　him　through　the　Blue　Ridge　into　eastern

Virginia。　　Indeed；　this　question　began　to　cause　me　solicitude　as　soon

as　I　knew　Early　had　escaped　me　at　New　Market；　for　I　felt　certain　that

I　should　be　urged　to　pursue　the　Confederates　toward　Charlottesville

and　Gordonsville；　and　be　expected　to　operate　on　that　line　against

Richmond。　　For　many　reasons　I　was　much　opposed　to　such　a　plan；　but

mainly　because　its　execution　would　involve　the　opening　of　the　Orange

and　Alexandria　railroad。　　To　protect　this　road　against　the　raids　of

the　numerous　guerrilla　bands　that　infested　the　region　through　which

it　passed；　and　to　keep　it　in　operation；　would　require　a　large　force

of　infantry；　and　would　also　greatly　reduce　my　cavalry；　besides；　I

should　be　obliged　to　leave　a　force　in　the　valley　strong　enough　to

give　security　to　the　line　of　the　upper　Potomac　and　the　Baltimore　and

Ohio　railroad；　and　this　alone　would　probably　take　the　whole　of

Crook's　command；　leaving　me　a　wholly　inadequate　number　of　fighting

men　to　prosecute　a　campaign　against　the　city　of　Richmond。　　Then；　too；

I　was　in　doubt　whether　the　besiegers　could　hold　the　entire　army　at

Petersburg；　and　in　case　they　could　not；　a　number　of　troops　sufficient

to　crush　me　might　be　detached　by　Lee；　moved　rapidly　by　rail；　and；

after　overwhelming　me；　be　quickly　returned　to　confront　General　Meade。

I　was　satisfied；　moreover；　that　my　transportation　could　not　supply　me

further　than　Harrisonburg；　and　if　in　penetrating　the　Blue　Ridge　I　met

with　protracted　resistance；　a　lack　of　supplies　might　compel　me　to

abandon　the　attempt　at　a　most　inopportune　time。



I　therefore　advised　that　the　Valley　campaign　be　terminated　north　of

Staunton；　and　I　be　permitted　to　return；　carrying　out　on　the　way　my

original　instructions　for　desolating　the　Shenandoah　country　so　as　to

make　it　untenable　for　permanent　occupation　by　the　Confederates。　　I

proposed　to　detach　the　bulk　of　my　army　when　this　work　of　destruction

was　completed；　and　send　it　by　way　of　the　Baltimore　and　Ohio　railroad

through　Washington　to　the　Petersburg　line；　believing　that　I　could

move　it　more　rapidly　by　that　route　than　by　any　other。　　I　was

confident　that　if　a　movement　of　this　character　could　be　made　with

celerity　it　would　culminate　in　the　capture　of　Richmond　and　possibly

of　General　Lee's　army；　and　I　was　in　hopes　that　General　Grant　would

take　the　same　view　of　the　matter；　but　just　at　this　time　he　was　so

pressed　by　the　Government　and　by　public…opinion　at　the　North；　that　he

advocated　the　wholly　different　conception　of　driving　Early　into

eastern　Virginia；　and　adhered　to　this　plan　with　some　tenacity。

Considerable　correspondence　regarding　the　subject　took　place　between

us；　throughout　which　I　stoutly　maintained　that　we　should　not　risk；　by

what　I　held　to　be　a　false　move；　all　that　my　army　had　gained。　　I　being

on　the　ground；　General　Grant　left　to　me　the　final　decision　of　the

question；　and　I　solved　the　first　step　by　determining　to　withdraw　down

the　valley　at　least　as　far　as　Strasburg；　which　movement　was　begun　on

the　6th　of　October。



The　cavalry　as　it　retired　was　stretched　across　the　country　from　the

Blue　Ridge　to　the　eastern　slope　of　the　Alleghanies；　with　orders　to

drive　off　all　stock　and　destroy　all　supplies　as　it　moved　northward。

The　infantry　preceded　the　cavalry；　passing　down　the　Valley　pike；　and

as　we　marched　along　the　many　columns　of　smoke　from　burning　stacks；

and　mills　filled　with　grain；　indicated　that　the　adjacent　country　was

fast　losing　the　features　which　hitherto　had　made　it　a　great　magazine

of　stores　for　the　Confederate　armies。



During　the　6th　and　7th　of　October；　the　enemy's　horse　followed　us　up；

though　at　a　respectful　distance。　　This　cavalry　was　now　under　command

of　General　T。　W。　Rosser；　who　on　October　5　had　joined　Early　with　an

additional　brigade　from　Richmond。　　As　we　proceeded　the　Confederates

gained　confidence；　probably　on　account　of　the　reputation　with　which

its　new　commander　had　been　heralded；　and　on　the　third　day's　march　had

the　temerity　to　annoy　my　rear　guard　considerably。　　Tired　of　these

annoyances；　I　concluded　to　open　the　enemy's　eyes　in　earnest；　so　that

night　I　told　Torbert　I　expected　him　either　to　give　Rosser　a　drubbing

next　morning　or　get　whipped　himself；　and　that　the　infantry　would　be

halted　until　the　affair　was　over；　I　also　informed　him　that　I　proposed

to　ride　out　to　Round　Top　Mountain　to　see　the　fight。　　When　I　decided

to　have　Rosser　chastised；　Merritt　was　encamped　at　the　foot　of　Round

Top；　an　elevation　just　north　of　Tom's　Brook；　and　Custer　some　six

miles　farther　north　and　west；　near　Tumbling　Run。　　In　the　night　Custer

was　ordered　to　retrace　his　steps　before　daylight　by　the　Back　road；

which　is　parallel　to　and　about　three　miles　from　the　Valley　pike；　and

attack　the　enemy　at　Tom's　Brook　crossing；　while　Merritt's

instructions　were　to　assail　him　on　the　Valley　pike　in　concert　with

Custer。　　About　7　in　the　morning；　Custer's　division　encountered　Rosser

himself　with　three　brigades；　and　while　the　stirring　sounds　of　the

resulting　artillery　duel　were　reverberating　through　the　valley

Merritt　moved　briskly　to　the　front　and　fell　upon　Generals　Lomax　and

Johnson　on　the　Valley　pike。　　Merritt；　by　extending　his　right；　quickly

established　connection　with　Custer；　and　the　two　divisions　moved

forward　together　under　Torbert's　direction；　with　a　determination　to

inflict　on　the　enemy　the　sharp　and　summary　punishment　his　rashness

had　invited。



The　engagement　soon　became　general　across　the　valley；　both　sides

fighting　mainly　mounted。