the+critique+of+practical+reason-第14部分

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good；　sometimes　directly；　sometimes　indirectly。　The　man　who　submits　to
a　surgical　operation　feels　it　no　doubt　as　a　bad　thing；　but　by　their
reason　he　and　everyone　acknowledge　it　to　be　good。　If　a　man　who
delights　in　annoying　and　vexing　peaceable　people　at　last　receives　a
right　good　beating；　this　is　no　doubt　a　bad　thing；　but　everyone
approves　it　and　regards　it　as　a　good　thing；　even　though　nothing　else
resulted　from　it；　nay；　even　the　man　who　receives　it　must　in　his　reason
acknowledge　that　he　has　met　justice；　because　he　sees　the　proportion
between　good　conduct　and　good　fortune；　which　reason　inevitably
places　before　him；　here　put　into　practice。
　　No　doubt　our　weal　and　woe　are　of　very　great　importance　in　the
estimation　of　our　practical　reason；　and　as　far　as　our　nature　as
sensible　beings　is　concerned；　our　happiness　is　the　only　thing　of
consequence；　provided　it　is　estimated　as　reason　especially　requires；
not　by　the　transitory　sensation；　but　by　the　influence　that　this　has　on
our　whole　existence；　and　on　our　satisfaction　therewith；　but　it　is
not　absolutely　the　only　thing　of　consequence。　Man　is　a　being　who；　as
belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　has　wants；　and　so　far　his　reason
has　an　office　which　it　cannot　refuse；　namely；　to　attend　to　the
interest　of　his　sensible　nature；　and　to　form　practical　maxims；　even
with　a　view　to　the　happiness　of　this　life；　and　if　possible　even　to
that　of　a　future。　But　he　is　not　so　pletely　an　animal　as　to　be
indifferent　to　what　reason　says　on　its　own　account；　and　to　use　it
merely　as　an　instrument　for　the　satisfaction　of　his　wants　as　a
sensible　being。　For　the　possession　of　reason　would　not　raise　his　worth
above　that　of　the　brutes；　if　it　is　to　serve　him　only　for　the　same
purpose　that　instinct　serves　in　them；　it　would　in　that　case　be　only
a　particular　method　which　nature　had　employed　to　equip　man　for　the
same　ends　for　which　it　has　qualified　brutes；　without　qualifying　him
for　any　higher　purpose。　No　doubt　once　this　arrangement　of　nature　has
been　made　for　him　he　requires　reason　in　order　to　take　into
consideration　his　weal　and　woe；　but　besides　this　he　possesses　it　for　a
higher　purpose　also；　namely；　not　only　to　take　into　consideration
what　is　good　or　evil　in　itself；　about　which　only　pure　reason；
uninfluenced　by　any　sensible　interest；　can　judge；　but　also　to
distinguish　this　estimate　thoroughly　from　the　former　and　to　make　it
the　supreme　condition　thereof。
　　In　estimating　what　is　good　or　evil　in　itself；　as　distinguished
from　what　can　be　so　called　only　relatively；　the　following　points　are
to　be　considered。　Either　a　rational　principle　is　already　conceived；　as
of　itself　the　determining　principle　of　the　will；　without　regard　to
possible　objects　of　desire　（and　therefore　by　the　more　legislative　form
of　the　maxim）；　and　in　that　case　that　principle　is　a　practical　a　priori
law；　and　pure　reason　is　supposed　to　be　practical　of　itself。　The　law　in
that　case　determines　the　will　directly；　the　action　conformed　to　it
is　good　in　itself；　a　will　whose　maxim　always　conforms　to　this　law　is
good　absolutely　in　every　respect　and　is　the　supreme　condition　of　all
good。　Or　the　maxim　of　the　will　is　consequent　on　a　determining
principle　of　desire　which　presupposes　an　object　of　pleasure　or　pain；
something　therefore　that　pleases　or　displeases；　and　the　maxim　of
reason　that　we　should　pursue　the　former　and　avoid　the　latter
determines　our　actions　as　good　relatively　to　our　inclination；　that　is；
good　indirectly；　i。e。；　relatively　to　a　different　end　to　which　they　are
means）；　and　in　that　case　these　maxims　can　never　be　called　laws；　but
may　be　called　rational　practical　precepts。　The　end　itself；　the
pleasure　that　we　seek；　is　in　the　latter　case　not　a　good　but　a　welfare；
not　a　concept　of　reason；　but　an　empirical　concept　of　an　object　of
sensation；　but　the　use　of　the　means　thereto；　that　is；　the　action；　is
nevertheless　called　good　（because　rational　deliberation　is　required
for　it）；　not　however；　good　absolutely；　but　only　relatively　to　our
sensuous　nature；　with　regard　to　its　feelings　of　pleasure　and
displeasure；　but　the　will　whose　maxim　is　affected　thereby　is　not　a
pure　will；　this　is　directed　only　to　that　in　which　pure　reason　by
itself　can　be　practical。
　　This　is　the　proper　place　to　explain　the　paradox　of　method　in　a
critique　of　practical　reason；　namely；　that　the　concept　of　good　and
evil　must　not　be　determined　before　the　moral　law　（of　which　it　seems　as
if　it　must　be　the　foundation）；　but　only　after　it　and　by　means　of　it。
In　fact；　even　if　we　did　not　know　that　the　principle　of　morality　is　a
pure　a　priori　law　determining　the　will；　yet；　that　we　may　not　assume
principles　quite　gratuitously；　we　must；　at　least　at　first；　leave　it
undecided；　whether　the　will　has　merely　empirical　principles　of
determination；　or　whether　it　has　not　also　pure　a　priori　principles；
for　it　is　contrary　to　all　rules　of　philosophical　method　to　assume　as
decided　that　which　is　the　very　point　in　question。　Supposing　that　we
wished　to　begin　with　the　concept　of　good；　in　order　to　deduce　from　it
the　laws　of　the　will；　then　this　concept　of　an　object　（as　a　good）　would
at　the　same　time　assign　to　us　this　object　as　the　sole　determining
principle　of　the　will。　Now；　since　this　concept　had　not　any　practical　a
priori　law　for　its　standard；　the　criterion　of　good　or　evil　could　not
be　placed　in　anything　but　the　agreement　of　the　object　with　our　feeling
of　pleasure　or　pain；　and　the　use　of　reason　could　only　consist　in
determining　in　the　first　place　this　pleasure　or　pain　in　connexion　with
all　the　sensations　of　my　existence；　and　in　the　second　place　the
means　of　securing　to　myself　the　object　of　the　pleasure。　Now；　as
experience　alone　can　decide　what　conforms　to　the　feeling　of
pleasure；　and　by　hypothesis　the　practical　law　is　to　be　based　on　this
as　a　condition；　it　follows　that　the　possibility　of　a　priori
practical　laws　would　be　at　once　excluded；　because　it　was　imagined　to
be　necessary　first　of　all　to　find　an　object　the　concept　of　which；　as　a
good；　should　constitute　the　universal　though　empirical　principle　of
determination　of　the　will。　But　what　it　was　necessary　to　inquire
first　of　all　was　whether　there　is　not　an　a　priori　determining
principle　of　the　will　（and　this　could　never　be　found　anywhere　but　in　a
pure　practical　law；　in　so　far　as　this　law　prescribes　to　maxims
merely　their　form　without　regard　to　an　object）。　Since；　however；　we
laid　the　foundation　of　all　practical　law　in　an　object　determined　by
our　conceptions　of　good　and　evil；　whereas　without　a　previous　law
that　object　could　not　be　conceived　by　empirical　concepts；　we　have
deprived　ourselves　beforehand　of　the　possibility　of　even　conceiving
a　pure　practical　law。　On　the　other　hand；　if　we　had　first
investigated　the　latter　analytically；　we　should　have　found　that　it
is　not　the　concept　of　good　as　an　object　that　determines　the　moral
law　and　makes　it　possible；　but　that；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　the
moral　law　that　first　determines　the　concept　of　good　and　makes　it
possible；　so　far　as　it　deserves　the　name　of　good　absolutely。
　　This　remark；　which　only　concerns　the　method　of　ultimate　ethical
inquiries；　is　of　importance。　It　explains　at　once　the　occasion　of　all
the　mistakes　of　philosophers　with　respect　to　the　supreme　principle
of　morals。　For　they　sought　for　an　object　of　the　will　which　they
could　make　the　matter　and　principle　of　a　law　（which　consequently　could
not　determine　the　will　directly；　but　by　means　of　that　object
referred　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　pain；　whereas　they　ought
first　to　have　searched　for　a　law　that　would　determine　the　will　a
priori　and　directly；　and　afterwards　determine　the　object　in　accordance
with　the　will）。　Now；　whether　they　placed　this　object　of　pleasure；
which　was　to　supply　the　supreme　conception　of　goodness；　in
happiness；　in　perfection；　in　moral　＇feeling＇；　or　in　the　will　of　God；
their　principle　in　every　case　implied　heteronomy；　and　they　must
inevitably　e　upon　empirical　conditions　of　a　moral　law；　since
their　object；　which　was　to　be　the　immediate　principle　of　the　will；
could　not　be　called　good　or　bad　except　in　its　immediate　relation　to
feeling；　which　is　always　empirical。　It　is　only　a　formal　law…　that
is；　one　which　prescribes　to　reason　nothing　more　than　the　form　of　its
universal　legislation　as　the　supreme　condition　of　its　maxims…　that　can
be　a　priori　a　determining　principle　of　practical　reason。　The
ancients　avowed　this　error　without　concealment　by　directing　all
their　moral　inquiries　to　the　determination　of　the　notion　of　the　summum
bonum；　which　they　intended　afterwards　to　make　the　determining
principle　of　the　will　in　the　moral　law；　whereas　it　is　only　far
later；　when　the　moral　law　has　been　first　established　for　itself；　and
shown　to　be　the　direct　determining　principle　of　the　will；　that　this
object　can　be　presented　to　the　will；　whose　form　is　now　determined　a
priori；　and　this　we　shall　undertake　in　the　Dialectic　of　the　pure
practical　reason。　The　moderns；　with　whom　the　question　of　the　summum
bonum　has　gone　out　of　fashion；　or　at　least　seems　to　have　bee　a
secondary　matter；　hide　the　same　error　under　vague　（expressions　as　in
many　other　cases）。　It　shows　itself；　nevertheless；　in　their　systems；　as
it　always　produces　heteronomy　of　practical　reason；　and　from　this　can
never　be　derived　a　moral　law　giving　universal　mands。
　　Now；　since　the　notions　of　good　and　evil；　as　consequences　of　the　a
priori　determination　of　the　will；　imply　also　a　pure　practical
principle；　and　therefore　a　causality　of　pure　reason；　hence　they　do　not
originally　refer　to　objects　（so　as　to　be；　for　instance；　special
modes　of　the　synthetic　unity　of　the　manifold　of　given　intuitions　in
one　consciousness）　like　the　pure　concepts　of　the　understanding　or
categories　of　reason　in　its　theoretic　employment；　on　the　contrary；
they　presuppose　that　objects　are　given；　but　they　are　all　modes
（modi）　of　a　single　category；　namely；　that　of　causality；　the
determining　principle　of　which　consists　in　the　rational　conception
of　a　law；　which　as　a　law　of　freedom　reason　gives　to　itself；　thereby
a　priori　proving　itself　practical。　However；　as　the　actions　on　the
one　side　e　under　a　law　which　is　not　a　physical　law；　but　a　law　of
freedom；　and　consequently　belong　to　the　conduct　of　beings　in　and
consequently　the　consequently　belong　to　the　beings　i