the+critique+of+practical+reason-第16部分

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secretly　allows　himself　to　deceive；　it　does　not　follow　that　everyone
else　does　so；　or　if；　unobserved；　he　is　destitute　of　passion；　others
would　not　necessarily　be　so　to　him；　hence；　this　parison　of　the
maxim　of　his　actions　with　a　universal　law　of　nature　is　not　the
determining　principle　of　his　will。　Such　a　law　is；　nevertheless；　a　type
of　the　estimation　of　the　maxim　on　moral　principles。　If　the　maxim　of
the　action　is　not　such　as　to　stand　the　test　of　the　form　of　a　universal
law　of　nature；　then　it　is　morally　impossible。　This　is　the　judgement
even　of　mon　sense；　for　its　ordinary　judgements；　even　those　of
experience；　are　always　based　on　the　law　of　nature。　It　has　it　therefore
always　at　hand；　only　that　in　cases　where　causality　from　freedom　is
to　be　criticised；　it　makes　that　law　of　nature　only　the　type　of　a　law
of　freedom；　because；　without　something　which　it　could　use　as　an
example　in　a　case　of　experience；　it　could　not　give　the　law　of　a　pure
practical　reason　its　proper　use　in　practice。
　　It　is　therefore　allowable　to　use　the　system　of　the　world　of　sense　as
the　type　of　a　supersensible　system　of　things；　provided　I　do　not
transfer　to　the　latter　the　intuitions；　and　what　depends　on　them；　but
merely　apply　to　it　the　form　of　law　in　general　（the　notion　of　which
occurs　even　in　the　monest　use　of　reason；　but　cannot　be　definitely
known　a　priori　for　any　other　purpose　than　the　pure　practical　use　of
reason）；　for　laws；　as　such；　are　so　far　identical；　no　matter　from
what　they　derive　their　determining　principles。
　　Further；　since　of　all　the　supersensible　absolutely　nothing　＇is
known＇　except　freedom　（through　the　moral　law）；　and　this　only　so　far　as
it　is　inseparably　implied　in　that　law；　and　moreover　all
supersensible　objects　to　which　reason　might　lead　us；　following　the
guidance　of　that　law；　have　still　no　reality　for　us；　except　for　the
purpose　of　that　law；　and　for　the　use　of　mere　practical　reason；　and
as　reason　is　authorized　and　even　pelled　to　use　physical　nature
（in　its　pure　form　as　an　object　of　the　understanding）　as　the　type　of
the　judgement；　hence；　the　present　remark　will　serve　to　guard　against
reckoning　amongst　concepts　themselves　that　which　belongs　only　to　the
typic　of　concepts。　This；　namely；　as　a　typic　of　the　judgement；　guards
against　the　empiricism　of　practical　reason；　which　founds　the　practical
notions　of　good　and　evil　merely　on　experienced　consequences　（so…called
happiness）。　No　doubt　happiness　and　the　infinite　advantages　which　would
result　from　a　will　determined　by　self…love；　if　this　will　at　the　same
time　erected　itself　into　a　universal　law　of　nature；　may　certainly
serve　as　a　perfectly　suitable　type　of　the　morally　good；　but　it　is
not　identical　with　it。　The　same　typic　guards　also　against　the
mysticism　of　practical　reason；　which　turns　what　served　only　as　a
symbol　into　a　schema；　that　is；　proposes　to　provide　for　the　moral
concepts　actual　intuitions；　which；　however；　are　not　sensible
（intuitions　of　an　invisible　Kingdom　of　God）；　and　thus　plunges　into　the
transcendent。　What　is　befitting　the　use　of　the　moral　concepts　is
only　the　rationalism　of　the　judgement；　which　takes　from　the　sensible
system　of　nature　only　what　pure　reason　can　also　conceive　of　itself；
that　is；　conformity　to　law；　and　transfers　into　the　supersensible
nothing　but　what　can　conversely　be　actually　exhibited　by　actions　in
the　world　of　sense　according　to　the　formal　rule　of　a　law　of　nature。
However；　the　caution　against　empiricism　of　practical　reason　is　much
more　important；　for　mysticism　is　quite　reconcilable　with　the　purity
and　sublimity　of　the　moral　law；　and；　besides；　it　is　not　very　natural
or　agreeable　to　mon　habits　of　thought　to　strain　one's　imagination
to　supersensible　intuitions；　and　hence　the　danger　on　this　side　is
not　so　general。　Empiricism；　on　the　contrary；　cuts　up　at　the　roots
the　morality　of　intentions　（in　which；　and　not　in　actions　only；
consists　the　high　worth　that　men　can　and　ought　to　give　to　themselves）；
and　substitutes　for　duty　something　quite　different；　namely；　an
empirical　interest；　with　which　the　inclinations　generally　are　secretly
leagued；　and　empiricism；　moreover；　being　on　this　account　allied　with
all　the　inclinations　which　（no　matter　what　fashion　they　put　on）
degrade　humanity　when　they　are　raised　to　the　dignity　of　a　supreme
practical　principle；　and　as　these；　nevertheless；　are　so　favourable
to　everyone's　feelings；　it　is　for　that　reason　much　more　dangerous　than
mysticism；　which　can　never　constitute　a　lasting　condition　of　any　great
number　of　persons。
　　　　CHAPTER　III。　Of　the　Motives　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　What　is　essential　in　the　moral　worth　of　actions　is　that　the　moral
law　should　directly　determine　the　will。　If　the　determination　of　the
will　takes　place　in　conformity　indeed　to　the　moral　law；　but　only　by
means　of　a　feeling；　no　matter　of　what　kind；　which　has　to　be
presupposed　in　order　that　the　law　may　be　sufficient　to　determine　the
will；　and　therefore　not　for　the　sake　of　the　law；　then　the　action
will　possess　legality；　but　not　morality。　Now；　if　we　understand　by
motive　（elater　animi）　the　subjective　ground　of　determination　of　the
will　of　a　being　whose　reason　does　not　necessarily　conform　to　the
objective　law；　by　virtue　of　its　own　nature；　then　it　will　follow；
first；　that　not　motives　can　be　attributed　to　the　Divine　will；　and　that
the　motives　of　the　human　will　（as　well　as　that　of　every　created
rational　being）　can　never　be　anything　else　than　the　moral　law；　and
consequently　that　the　objective　principle　of　determination　must　always
and　alone　be　also　the　subjectively　sufficient　determining　principle　of
the　action；　if　this　is　not　merely　to　fulfil　the　letter　of　the　law；
without　containing　its　spirit。*

　　*We　may　say　of　every　action　that　conforms　to　the　law；　but　is　not
done　for　the　sake　of　the　law；　that　it　is　morally　good　in　the　letter；
not　in　the　spirit　（the　intention）。

　　Since；　then；　for　the　purpose　of　giving　the　moral　law　influence
over　the　will；　we　must　not　seek　for　any　other　motives　that　might
enable　us　to　dispense　with　the　motive　of　the　law　itself；　because
that　would　produce　mere　hypocrisy；　without　consistency；　and　it　is　even
dangerous　to　allow　other　motives　（for　instance；　that　of　interest）　even
to　co…operate　along　with　the　moral　law；　hence　nothing　is　left　us　but
to　determine　carefully　in　what　way　the　moral　law　bees　a　motive；　and
what　effect　this　has　upon　the　faculty　of　desire。　For　as　to　the
question　how　a　law　can　be　directly　and　of　itself　a　determining
principle　of　the　will　（which　is　the　essence　of　morality）；　this　is；　for
human　reason；　an　insoluble　problem　and　identical　with　the　question：
how　a　free　will　is　possible。　Therefore　what　we　have　to　show　a　priori
is　not　why　the　moral　law　in　itself　supplies　a　motive；　but　what
effect　it；　as　such；　produces　（or；　more　correctly　speaking；　must
produce）　on　the　mind。
　　The　essential　point　in　every　determination　of　the　will　by　the
moral　law　is　that　being　a　free　will　it　is　determined　simply　by　the
moral　law；　not　only　without　the　co…operation　of　sensible　impulses；　but
even　to　the　rejection　of　all　such；　and　to　the　checking　of　all
inclinations　so　far　as　they　might　be　opposed　to　that　law。　So　far；
then；　the　effect　of　the　moral　law　as　a　motive　is　only　negative；　and
this　motive　can　be　known　a　priori　to　be　such。　For　all　inclination
and　every　sensible　impulse　is　founded　on　feeling；　and　the　negative
effect　produced　on　feeling　（by　the　check　on　the　inclinations）　is
itself　feeling；　consequently；　we　can　see　a　priori　that　the　moral
law；　as　a　determining　principle　of　the　will；　must　by　thwarting　all　our
inclinations　produce　a　feeling　which　may　be　called　pain；　and　in　this
we　have　the　first；　perhaps　the　only；　instance　in　which　we　are　able
from　a　priori　considerations　to　determine　the　relation　of　a
cognition　（in　this　case　of　pure　practical　reason）　to　the　feeling　of
pleasure　or　displeasure。　All　the　inclinations　together　（which　can　be
reduced　to　a　tolerable　system；　in　which　case　their　satisfaction　is
called　happiness）　constitute　self…regard　（solipsismus）。　This　is　either
the　self…love　that　consists　in　an　excessive　fondness　for　oneself
（philautia）；　or　satisfaction　with　oneself　（arrogantia）。　The　former
is　called　particularly　selfishness；　the　latter　self…conceit。　Pure
practical　reason　only　checks　selfishness；　looking　on　it　as　natural　and
active　in　us　even　prior　to　the　moral　law；　so　far　as　to　limit　it　to　the
condition　of　agreement　with　this　law；　and　then　it　is　called　rational
self…love。　But　self…conceit　reason　strikes　down　altogether；　since
all　claims　to　self…esteem　which　precede　agreement　with　the　moral　law
are　vain　and　unjustifiable；　for　the　certainty　of　a　state　of　mind
that　coincides　with　this　law　is　the　first　condition　of　personal
worth　（as　we　shall　presently　show　more　clearly）；　and　prior　to　this
conformity　any　pretension　to　worth　is　false　and　unlawful。　Now　the
propensity　to　self…esteem　is　one　of　the　inclinations　which　the　moral
law　checks；　inasmuch　as　that　esteem　rests　only　on　morality。
Therefore　the　moral　law　breaks　down　self…conceit。　But　as　this　law　is
something　positive　in　itself；　namely；　the　form　of　an　intellectual
causality；　that　is；　of　freedom；　it　must　be　an　object　of　respect；
for；　by　opposing　the　subjective　antagonism　of　the　inclinations；　it
weakens　self…conceit；　and　since　it　even　breaks　down；　that　is；
humiliates；　this　conceit；　it　is　an　object　of　the　highest　respect
and；　consequently；　is　the　foundation　of　a　positive　feeling　which　is
not　of　empirical　origin；　but　is　known　a　priori。　Therefore　respect
for　the　moral　law　is　a　feeling　which　is　produced　by　an　intellectual
cause；　and　this　feeling　is　the　only　one　that　we　know　quite　a　priori
and　the　necessity　of　which　we　can　perceive。
　　In　the　preceding　chapter　we　have　seen　that　everything　that
presents　itself　as　an　object　of　the　will　prior　to　the　moral　law　is
by　that　law　itself；　which　is　the　supreme　condition　of　practical
reason；　excluded　from　the　determining　principles　of　the　will　which
we　have　called　the　unconditionally　good；　and　that　the　mere　practical
form　which　consists　in　the　adaptation　of　the　maxims　to　universal
legislation　first　determines　what　is　good　in　itself　and　absolutely；
and　is　the　basis　of　the　maxims　of　a　pure　will；　which　alone　is　good
in　every　respect。　However；　we　find　that