the+critique+of+practical+reason-第22部分

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the　determining　physical　cause　of　which　lies　within　the　acting　thing
itself；　e。g。；　that　which　a　projectile　performs　when　it　is　in　free
motion；　in　which　case　we　use　the　word　freedom；　because　while　it　is
in　flight　it　is　not　urged　by　anything　external；　or　as　we　call　the
motion　of　a　clock　a　free　motion；　because　it　moves　its　hands　itself；
which　therefore　do　not　require　to　be　pushed　by　external　force；　so
although　the　actions　of　man　are　necessarily　determined　by　causes　which
precede　in　time；　we　yet　call　them　free；　because　these　causes　are　ideas
produced　by　our　own　faculties；　whereby　desires　are　evoked　on
occasion　of　circumstances；　and　hence　actions　are　wrought　according
to　our　own　pleasure。　This　is　a　wretched　subterfuge　with　which　some
persons　still　let　themselves　be　put　off；　and　so　think　they　have
solved；　with　a　petty　word…　jugglery；　that　difficult　problem；　at　the
solution　of　which　centuries　have　laboured　in　vain；　and　which　can
therefore　scarcely　be　found　so　pletely　on　the　surface。　In　fact；
in　the　question　about　the　freedom　which　must　be　the　foundation　of
all　moral　laws　and　the　consequent　responsibility；　it　does　not　matter
whether　the　principles　which　necessarily　determine　causality　by　a
physical　law　reside　within　the　subject　or　without　him；　or　in　the
former　case　whether　these　principles　are　instinctive　or　are
conceived　by　reason；　if；　as　is　admitted　by　these　men　themselves；　these
determining　ideas　have　the　ground　of　their　existence　in　time　and　in
the　antecedent　state；　and　this　again　in　an　antecedent；　etc。　Then　it
matters　not　that　these　are　internal；　it　matters　not　that　they　have　a
psychological　and　not　a　mechanical　causality；　that　is；　produce　actions
by　means　of　ideas　and　not　by　bodily　movements；　they　are　still
determining　principles　of　the　causality　of　a　being　whose　existence
is　determinable　in　time；　and　therefore　under　the　necessitation　of
conditions　of　past　time；　which　therefore；　when　the　subject　has　to　act；
are　no　longer　in　his　power。　This　may　imply　psychological　freedom　（if
we　choose　to　apply　this　term　to　a　merely　internal　chain　of　ideas　in
the　mind）；　but　it　involves　physical　necessity　and；　therefore；　leaves
no　room　for　transcendental　freedom；　which　must　be　conceived　as
independence　on　everything　empirical；　and；　consequently；　on　nature
generally；　whether　it　is　an　object　of　the　internal　sense　considered　in
time　only；　or　of　the　external　in　time　and　space。　Without　this
freedom　（in　the　latter　and　true　sense）；　which　alone　is　practical　a
priori；　no　moral　law　and　no　moral　imputation　are　possible。　just　for
this　reason　the　necessity　of　events　in　time；　according　to　the　physical
law　of　causality；　may　be　called　the　mechanism　of　nature；　although　we
do　not　mean　by　this　that　things　which　are　subject　to　it　must　be　really
material　machines。　We　look　here　only　to　the　necessity　of　the
connection　of　events　in　a　time…series　as　it　is　developed　according
to　the　physical　law；　whether　the　subject　in　which　this　development
takes　place　is　called　automaton　materiale　when　the　mechanical　being　is
moved　by　matter；　or　with　Leibnitz　spirituale　when　it　is　impelled　by
ideas；　and　if　the　freedom　of　our　will　were　no　other　than　the　latter
（say　the　psychological　and　parative；　not　also　transcendental；
that　is；　absolute）；　then　it　would　at　bottom　be　nothing　better　than　the
freedom　of　a　turnspit；　which；　when　once　it　is　wound　up；　acplishes
its　motions　of　itself。
　　Now；　in　order　to　remove　in　the　supposed　case　the　apparent
contradiction　between　freedom　and　the　mechanism　of　nature　in　one　and
the　same　action；　we　must　remember　what　was　said　in　the　Critique　of
Pure　Reason；　or　what　follows　therefrom；　viz。；　that　the　necessity　of
nature；　which　cannot　co…exist　with　the　freedom　of　the　subject；
appertains　only　to　the　attributes　of　the　thing　that　is　subject　to
time…conditions；　consequently　only　to　those　of　the　acting　subject　as　a
phenomenon；　that　therefore　in　this　respect　the　determining
principles　of　every　action　of　the　same　reside　in　what　belongs　to
past　time　and　is　no　longer　in　his　power　（in　which　must　be　included　his
own　past　actions　and　the　character　that　these　may　determine　for　him　in
his　own　eyes　as　a　phenomenon）。　But　the　very　same　subject；　being　on　the
other　side　conscious　of　himself　as　a　thing　in　himself；　considers　his
existence　also　in　so　far　as　it　is　not　subject　to　time…conditions；
and　regards　himself　as　only　determinable　by　laws　which　he　gives
himself　through　reason；　and　in　this　his　existence　nothing　is
antecedent　to　the　determination　of　his　will；　but　every　action；　and
in　general　every　modification　of　his　existence；　varying　according　to
his　internal　sense；　even　the　whole　series　of　his　existence　as　a
sensible　being　is　in　the　consciousness　of　his　supersensible
existence　nothing　but　the　result；　and　never　to　be　regarded　as　the
determining　principle；　of　his　causality　as　a　noumenon。　In　this　view
now　the　rational　being　can　justly　say　of　every　unlawful　action　that　he
performs；　that　he　could　very　well　have　left　it　undone；　although　as
appearance　it　is　sufficiently　determined　in　the　past；　and　in　this
respect　is　absolutely　necessary；　for　it；　with　all　the　past　which
determines　it；　belongs　to　the　one　single　phenomenon　of　his　character
which　he　makes　for　himself；　in　consequence　of　which　he　imputes　the
causality　of　those　appearances　to　himself　as　a　cause　independent　of
sensibility。
　　With　this　agree　perfectly　the　judicial　sentences　of　that　wonderful
faculty　in　us　which　we　call　conscience。　A　man　may　use　as　much　art　as
he　likes　in　order　to　paint　to　himself　an　unlawful　act；　that　he
remembers；　as　an　unintentional　error；　a　mere　oversight；　such　as　one
can　never　altogether　avoid；　and　therefore　as　something　in　which　he　was
carried　away　by　the　stream　of　physical　necessity；　and　thus　to　make
himself　out　innocent；　yet　he　finds　that　the　advocate　who　speaks　in　his
favour　can　by　no　means　silence　the　accuser　within；　if　only　he　is
conscious　that　at　the　time　when　he　did　this　wrong　he　was　in　his
senses；　that　is；　in　possession　of　his　freedom；　and；　nevertheless；　he
accounts　for　his　error　from　some　bad　habits；　which　by　gradual
neglect　of　attention　he　has　allowed　to　grow　upon　him　to　such　a
degree　that　he　can　regard　his　error　as　its　natural　consequence；
although　this　cannot　protect　him　from　the　blame　and　reproach　which
he　casts　upon　himself。　This　is　also　the　ground　of　repentance　for　a
long　past　action　at　every　recollection　of　it；　a　painful　feeling
produced　by　the　moral　sentiment；　and　which　is　practically　void　in　so
far　as　it　cannot　serve　to　undo　what　has　been　done。　（Hence　Priestley；
as　a　true　and　consistent　fatalist；　declares　it　absurd；　and　he　deserves
to　be　mended　for　this　candour　more　than　those　who；　while　they
maintain　the　mechanism　of　the　will　in　fact；　and　its　freedom　in　words
only；　yet　wish　it　to　be　thought　that　they　include　it　in　their　system
of　promise；　although　they　do　not　explain　the　possibility　of　such
moral　imputation。）　But　the　pain　is　quite　legitimate；　because　when
the　law　of　our　intelligible　＇supersensible＇　existence　（the　moral
law）　is　in　question；　reason　recognizes　no　distinction　of　time；　and
only　asks　whether　the　event　belongs　to　me；　as　my　act；　and　then
always　morally　connects　the　same　feeling　with　it；　whether　it　has
happened　just　now　or　long　ago。　For　in　reference　to　the　supersensible
consciousness　of　its　existence　（i。e。；　freedom）　the　life　of　sense　is
but　a　single　phenomenon；　which；　inasmuch　as　it　contains　merely
manifestations　of　the　mental　disposition　with　regard　to　the　moral
law　（i。e。；　of　the　character）；　must　be　judged　not　according　to　the
physical　necessity　that　belongs　to　it　as　phenomenon；　but　according
to　the　absolute　spontaneity　of　freedom。　It　may　therefore　be　admitted
that；　if　it　were　possible　to　have　so　profound　an　insight　into　a
man's　mental　character　as　shown　by　internal　as　well　as　external
actions　as　to　know　all　its　motives；　even　the　smallest；　and　likewise
all　the　external　occasions　that　can　influence　them；　we　could　calculate
a　man's　conduct　for　the　future　with　as　great　certainty　as　a　lunar　or
solar　eclipse；　and　nevertheless　we　may　maintain　that　the　man　is
free。　In　fact；　if　we　were　capable　of　a　further　glance；　namely；　an
intellectual　intuition　of　the　same　subject　（which　indeed　is　not
granted　to　us；　and　instead　of　it　we　have　only　the　rational　concept）；
then　we　should　perceive　that　this　whole　chain　of　appearances　in　regard
to　all　that　concerns　the　moral　laws　depends　on　the　spontaneity　of
the　subject　as　a　thing　in　itself；　of　the　determination　of　which　no
physical　explanation　can　be　given。　In　default　of　this　intuition；　the
moral　law　assures　us　of　this　distinction　between　the　relation　of　our
actions　as　appearance　to　our　sensible　nature；　and　the　relation　of　this
sensible　nature　to　the　supersensible　substratum　in　us。　In　this　view；
which　is　natural　to　our　reason；　though　inexplicable；　we　can　also
justify　some　judgements　which　we　passed　with　all　conscientiousness；
and　which　yet　at　first　sight　seem　quite　opposed　to　all　equity。　There
are　cases　in　which　men；　even　with　the　same　education　which　has　been
profitable　to　others；　yet　show　such　early　depravity；　and　so　continue
to　progress　in　it　to　years　of　manhood；　that　they　are　thought　to　be
born　villains；　and　their　character　altogether　incapable　of
improvement；　and　nevertheless　they　are　judged　for　what　they　do　or
leave　undone；　they　are　reproached　for　their　faults　as　guilty；　nay；
they　themselves　（the　children）　regard　these　reproaches　as　well
founded；　exactly　as　if　in　spite　of　the　hopeless　natural　quality　of
mind　ascribed　to　them；　they　remained　just　as　responsible　as　any
other　man。　This　could　not　happen　if　we　did　not　suppose　that　whatever
springs　from　a　man's　choice　（as　every　action　intentionally　performed
undoubtedly　does）　has　as　its　foundation　a　free　causality；　which　from
early　youth　expresses　its　character　in　its　manifestations　（i。e。；
actions）。　These；　on　account　of　the　uniformity　of　conduct；　exhibit　a
natural　connection；　which　however　does　not　make　the　vicious　quality　of
the　will　necessary；　but　on　the　contrary；　is　the　consequence　of　the
evil　principles　voluntarily　adopted　and　unchangeable；　which　only
make　it　so　much　the　more　culpable　and　deserving　of　punishment。　There
still　remains　a　difficulty　in　the　bination　of　freedo