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master　in　the　knowledge　of　wisdom；　which　implies　more　than　a　modest
man　would　claim　for　himself。　Thus　philosophy　as　well　as　wisdom　would
always　remain　an　ideal；　which　objectively　is　presented　plete　in
reason　alone；　while　subjectively　for　the　person　it　is　only　the　goal　of
his　unceasing　endeavours；　and　no　one　would　be　justified　in
professing　to　be　in　possession　of　it　so　as　to　assume　the　name　of
philosopher　who　could　not　also　show　its　infallible　effects　in　his
own　person　as　an　example　（in　his　self…mastery　and　the　unquestioned
interest　that　he　takes　pre…eminently　in　the　general　good）；　and　this
the　ancients　also　required　as　a　condition　of　deserving　that　honourable
title。
　　We　have　another　preliminary　remark　to　make　respecting　the
dialectic　of　the　pure　practical　reason；　on　the　point　of　the　definition
of　the　summum　bonum　（a　successful　solution　of　which　dialectic　would
lead　us　to　expect；　as　in　case　of　that　of　the　theoretical　reason；　the
most　beneficial　effects；　inasmuch　as　the　self…contradictions　of　pure
practical　reason　honestly　stated；　and　not　concealed；　force　us　to
undertake　a　plete　critique　of　this　faculty）。
　　The　moral　law　is　the　sole　determining　principle　of　a　pure　will。
But　since　this　is　merely　formal　（viz。；　as　prescribing　only　the　form　of
the　maxim　as　universally　legislative）；　it　abstracts　as　a　determining
principle　from　all　matter　that　is　to　say；　from　every　object　of
volition。　Hence；　though　the　summum　bonum　may　be　the　whole　object　of
a　pure　practical　reason；　i。e。；　a　pure　will；　yet　it　is　not　on　that
account　to　be　regarded　as　its　determining　principle；　and　the　moral　law
alone　must　be　regarded　as　the　principle　on　which　that　and　its
realization　or　promotion　are　aimed　at。　This　remark　is　important　in
so　delicate　a　case　as　the　determination　of　moral　principles；　where　the
slightest　misinterpretation　perverts　men's　minds。　For　it　will　have
been　seen　from　the　Analytic　that；　if　we　assume　any　object　under　the
name　of　a　good　as　a　determining　principle　of　the　will　prior　to　the
moral　law　and　then　deduce　from　it　the　supreme　practical　principle；
this　would　always　introduce　heteronomy　and　crush　out　the　moral
principle。
　　It　is；　however；　evident　that　if　the　notion　of　the　summum　bonum
includes　that　of　the　moral　law　as　its　supreme　condition；　then　the
summum　bonum　would　not　merely　be　an　object；　but　the　notion　of　it　and
the　conception　of　its　existence　as　possible　by　our　own　practical
reason　would　likewise　be　the　determining　principle　of　the　will；
since　in　that　case　the　will　is　in　fact　determined　by　the　moral　law
which　is　already　included　in　this　conception；　and　by　no　other
object；　as　the　principle　of　autonomy　requires。　This　order　of　the
conceptions　of　determination　of　the　will　must　not　be　lost　sight　of；　as
otherwise　we　should　misunderstand　ourselves　and　think　we　had　fallen
into　a　contradiction；　while　everything　remains　in　perfect　harmony。
　　　　CHAPTER　II。　Of　the　Dialectic　of　Pure　Reason　in　defining　the
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Conception　of　the　〃Summum　Bonum〃。

　　The　conception　of　the　summum　itself　contains　an　ambiguity　which
might　occasion　needless　disputes　if　we　did　not　attend　to　it。　The
summum　may　mean　either　the　supreme　（supremum）　or　the　perfect
（consummatum）。　The　former　is　that　condition　which　is　itself
unconditioned；　i。e。；　is　not　subordinate　to　any　other　（originarium）；
the　second　is　that　whole　which　is　not　a　part　of　a　greater　whole　of　the
same　kind　（perfectissimum）。　It　has　been　shown　in　the　Analytic　that
virtue　（as　worthiness　to　be　happy）　is　the　supreme　condition　of　all
that　can　appear　to　us　desirable；　and　consequently　of　all　our　pursuit
of　happiness；　and　is　therefore　the　supreme　good。　But　it　does　not
follow　that　it　is　the　whole　and　perfect　good　as　the　object　of　the
desires　of　rational　finite　beings；　for　this　requires　happiness　also；
and　that　not　merely　in　the　partial　eyes　of　the　person　who　makes
himself　an　end；　but　even　in　the　judgement　of　an　impartial　reason；
which　regards　persons　in　general　as　ends　in　themselves。　For　to　need
happiness；　to　deserve　it；　and　yet　at　the　same　time　not　to
participate　in　it；　cannot　be　consistent　with　the　perfect　volition　of　a
rational　being　possessed　at　the　same　time　of　all　power；　if；　for　the
sake　of　experiment；　we　conceive　such　a　being。　Now　inasmuch　as　virtue
and　happiness　together　constitute　the　possession　of　the　summum　bonum
in　a　person；　and　the　distribution　of　happiness　in　exact　proportion
to　morality　（which　is　the　worth　of　the　person；　and　his　worthiness　to
be　happy）　constitutes　the　summum　bonum　of　a　possible　world；　hence　this
summum　bonum　expresses　the　whole；　the　perfect　good；　in　which；　however；
virtue　as　the　condition　is　always　the　supreme　good；　since　it　has　no
condition　above　it；　whereas　happiness；　while　it　is　pleasant　to　the
possessor　of　it；　is　not　of　itself　absolutely　and　in　all　respects　good；
but　always　presupposes　morally　right　behaviour　as　its　condition。
　　When　two　elements　are　necessarily　united　in　one　concept；　they　must
be　connected　as　reason　and　consequence；　and　this　either　so　that
their　unity　is　considered　as　analytical　（logical　connection）；　or　as
synthetical　（real　connection）　the　former　following　the　law　of
identity；　the　latter　that　of　causality。　The　connection　of　virtue　and
happiness　may　therefore　be　understood　in　two　ways：　either　the
endeavour　to　be　virtuous　and　the　rational　pursuit　of　happiness　are　not
two　distinct　actions；　but　absolutely　identical；　in　which　case　no　maxim
need　be　made　the　principle　of　the　former；　other　than　what　serves　for
the　latter；　or　the　connection　consists　in　this；　that　virtue　produces
happiness　as　something　distinct　from　the　consciousness　of　virtue；　as　a
cause　produces　an　effect。
　　The　ancient　Greek　schools　were；　properly　speaking；　only　two；　and
in　determining　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　these　followed　in
fact　one　and　the　same　method；　inasmuch　as　they　did　not　allow　virtue
and　happiness　to　be　regarded　as　two　distinct　elements　of　the　summum
bonum；　and　consequently　sought　the　unity　of　the　principle　by　the
rule　of　identity；　but　they　differed　as　to　which　of　the　two　was　to　be
taken　as　the　fundamental　notion。　The　Epicurean　said：　〃To　be
conscious　that　one's　maxims　lead　to　happiness　is　virtue〃；　the　Stoic
said：　〃To　be　conscious　of　one's　virtue　is　happiness。〃　With　the　former；
Prudence　was　equivalent　to　morality；　with　the　latter；　who　chose　a
higher　designation　for　virtue；　morality　alone　was　true　wisdom。
　　While　we　must　admire　the　men　who　in　such　early　times　tried　all
imaginable　ways　of　extending　the　domain　of　philosophy；　we　must　at
the　same　time　lament　that　their　acuteness　was　unfortunately　misapplied
in　trying　to　trace　out　identity　between　two　extremely　heterogeneous
notions；　those　of　happiness　and　virtue。　But　it　agrees　with　the
dialectical　spirit　of　their　times　（and　subtle　minds　are　even　now
sometimes　misled　in　the　same　way）　to　get　rid　of　irreconcilable
differences　in　principle　by　seeking　to　change　them　into　a　mere　contest
about　words；　and　thus　apparently　working　out　the　identity　of　the
notion　under　different　names；　and　this　usually　occurs　in　cases　where
the　bination　of　heterogeneous　principles　lies　so　deep　or　so　high；
or　would　require　so　plete　a　transformation　of　the　doctrines　assumed
in　the　rest　of　the　philosophical　system；　that　men　are　afraid　to
penetrate　deeply　into　the　real　difference　and　prefer　treating　it　as
a　difference　in　questions　of　form。
　　While　both　schools　sought　to　trace　out　the　identity　of　the　practical
principles　of　virtue　and　happiness；　they　were　not　agreed　as　to　the　way
in　which　they　tried　to　force　this　identity；　but　were　separated
infinitely　from　one　another；　the　one　placing　its　principle　on　the　side
of　sense；　the　other　on　that　of　reason；　the　one　in　the　consciousness　of
sensible　wants；　the　other　in　the　independence　of　practical　reason　on
all　sensible　grounds　of　determination。　According　to　the　Epicurean；　the
notion　of　virtue　was　already　involved　in　the　maxim：　〃To　promote
one's　own　happiness〃；　according　to　the　Stoics；　on　the　other　hand；
the　feeling　of　happiness　was　already　contained　in　the　consciousness　of
virtue。　Now　whatever　is　contained　in　another　notion　is　identical
with　part　of　the　containing　notion；　but　not　with　the　whole；　and
moreover　two　wholes　may　be　specifically　distinct；　although　they
consist　of　the　same　parts；　namely　if　the　parts　are　united　into　a　whole
in　totally　different　ways。　The　Stoic　maintained　that　the　virtue　was
the　whole　summum　bonum；　and　happiness　only　the　consciousness　of
possessing　it；　as　making　part　of　the　state　of　the　subject。　The
Epicurean　maintained　that　happiness　was　the　whole　summum　bonum；　and
virtue　only　the　form　of　the　maxim　for　its　pursuit；　viz。；　the
rational　use　of　the　means　for　attaining　it。
　　Now　it　is　clear　from　the　Analytic　that　the　maxims　of　virtue　and
those　of　private　happiness　are　quite　heterogeneous　as　to　their　supreme
practical　principle；　and；　although　they　belong　to　one　summum　bonum
which　together　they　make　possible；　yet　they　are　so　far　from　coinciding
that　they　restrict　and　check　one　another　very　much　in　the　same
subject。　Thus　the　question：　〃How　is　the　summum　bonum　practically
possible？〃　still　remains　an　unsolved　problem；　notwithstanding　all
the　attempts　at　coalition　that　have　hitherto　been　made。　The　Analytic
has；　however；　shown　what　it　is　that　makes　the　problem　difficult　to
solve；　namely；　that　happiness　and　morality　are　two　specifically
distinct　elements　of　the　summum　bonum　and；　therefore；　their
bination　cannot　be　analytically　cognised　（as　if　the　man　that
seeks　his　own　happiness　should　find　by　mere　analysis　of　his　conception
that　in　so　acting　he　is　virtuous；　or　as　if　the　man　that　follows　virtue
should　in　the　consciousness　of　such　conduct　find　that　he　is　already
happy　ipso　facto）；　but　must　be　a　synthesis　of　concepts。　Now　since　this
bination　is　recognised　as　a　priori；　and　therefore　as　practically
necessary；　and　consequently　not　as　derived　from　experience；　so　that
the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum　does　not　rest　on　any　empirical
principle；　it　follows　that　the　deduction　＇legitimation＇　of　this
concept　must　be　transcendental。　It　is　a　priori　（morally）　necessary
to　produce　the　summum　bonum　by　freedom　of　will：　therefore　the
condition　of　its　possibility　must　rest　solely　on　a　priori　principles
of