the+critique+of+practical+reason-第27部分

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consciousness　of　virtue？　Yes　this　word　is　self…contentment　which　in
its　proper　signification　always　designates　only　a　negative
satisfaction　in　one's　existence；　in　which　one　is　conscious　of
needing　nothing。　Freedom　and　the　consciousness　of　it　as　a　faculty　of
following　the　moral　law　with　unyielding　resolution　is　independence
of　inclinations；　at　least　as　motives　determining　（though　not　as
affecting）　our　desire；　and　so　far　as　I　am　conscious　of　this　freedom　in
following　my　moral　maxims；　it　is　the　only　source　of　an　unaltered
contentment　which　is　necessarily　connected　with　it　and　rests　on　no
special　feeling。　This　may　be　called　intellectual　contentment。　The
sensible　contentment　（improperly　so…called）　which　rests　on　the
satisfaction　of　the　inclinations；　however　delicate　they　may　be
imagined　to　be；　can　never　be　adequate　to　the　conception　of　it。　For　the
inclinations　change；　they　grow　with　the　indulgence　shown　them；　and
always　leave　behind　a　still　greater　void　than　we　had　thought　to
fill。　Hence　they　are　always　burdensome　to　a　rational　being；　and；
although　he　cannot　lay　them　aside；　they　wrest　from　him　the　wish　to
be　rid　of　them。　Even　an　inclination　to　what　is　right　（e。g。；　to
beneficence）；　though　it　may　much　facilitate　the　efficacy　of　the
moral　maxims；　cannot　produce　any。　For　in　these　all　must　be　directed　to
the　conception　of　the　law　as　a　determining　principle；　if　the　action　is
to　contain　morality　and　not　merely　legality。　Inclination　is　blind
and　slavish；　whether　it　be　of　a　good　sort　or　not；　and；　when　morality
is　in　question；　reason　must　not　play　the　part　merely　of　guardian　to
inclination；　but　disregarding　it　altogether　must　attend　simply　to
its　own　interest　as　pure　practical　reason。　This　very　feeling　of
passion　and　tender　sympathy；　if　it　precedes　the　deliberation　on　the
question　of　duty　and　bees　a　determining　principle；　is　even　annoying
to　right　thinking　persons；　brings　their　deliberate　maxims　into
confusion；　and　makes　them　wish　to　be　delivered　from　it　and　to　be
subject　to　lawgiving　reason　alone。
　　From　this　we　can　understand　how　the　consciousness　of　this　faculty　of
a　pure　practical　reason　produces　by　action　（virtue）　a　consciousness　of
mastery　over　one's　inclinations；　and　therefore　of　independence　of
them；　and　consequently　also　of　the　discontent　that　always
acpanies　them；　and　thus　a　negative　satisfaction　with　one's　state；
i。e。；　contentment；　which　is　primarily　contentment　with　one's　own
person。　Freedom　itself　bees　in　this　way　（namely；　indirectly）
capable　of　an　enjoyment　which　cannot　be　called　happiness；　because　it
does　not　depend　on　the　positive　concurrence　of　a　feeling；　nor　is　it；
strictly　speaking；　bliss；　since　it　does　not　include　plete
independence　of　inclinations　and　wants；　but　it　resembles　bliss　in　so
far　as　the　determination　of　one's　will　at　least　can　hold　itself　free
from　their　influence；　and　thus；　at　least　in　its　origin；　this　enjoyment
is　analogous　to　the　self…sufficiency　which　we　can　ascribe　only　to
the　Supreme　Being。
　　From　this　solution　of　the　antinomy　of　practical　pure　reason；　it
follows　that　in　practical　principles　we　may　at　least　conceive　as
possible　a　natural　and　necessary　connection　between　the
consciousness　of　morality　and　the　expectation　of　a　proportionate
happiness　as　its　result；　though　it　does　not　follow　that　we　can　know　or
perceive　this　connection；　that；　on　the　other　hand；　principles　of　the
pursuit　of　happiness　cannot　possibly　produce　morality；　that；
therefore；　morality　is　the　supreme　good　（as　the　first　condition　of　the
summum　bonum）；　while　happiness　constitutes　its　second　element；　but
only　in　such　a　way　that　it　is　the　morally　conditioned；　but　necessary
consequence　of　the　former。　Only　with　this　subordination　is　the
summum　bonum　the　whole　object　of　pure　practical　reason；　which　must
necessarily　conceive　it　as　possible；　since　it　mands　us　to
contribute　to　the　utmost　of　our　power　to　its　realization。　But　since
the　possibility　of　such　connection　of　the　conditioned　with　its
condition　belongs　wholly　to　the　supersensual　relation　of　things　and
cannot　be　given　according　to　the　laws　of　the　world　of　sense；
although　the　practical　consequences　of　the　idea　belong　to　the　world　of
sense；　namely；　the　actions　that　aim　at　realizing　the　summum　bonum；
we　will　therefore　endeavour　to　set　forth　the　grounds　of　that
possibility；　first；　in　respect　of　what　is　immediately　in　our　power；
and　then；　secondly；　in　that　which　is　not　in　our　power；　but　which
reason　presents　to　us　as　the　supplement　of　our　impotence；　for　the
realization　of　the　summum　bonum　（which　by　practical　principles　is
necessary）。

　　　　III。　Of　the　Primacy　of　Pure　Practical　Reason　in　its
　　　　　　　　　　　Union　with　the　Speculative　Reason。

　　By　primacy　between　two　or　more　things　connected　by　reason；　I
understand　the　prerogative；　belonging　to　one；　of　being　the　first
determining　principle　in　the　connection　with　all　the　rest。　In　a
narrower　practical　sense　it　means　the　prerogative　of　the　interest　of
one　in　so　far　as　the　interest　of　the　other　is　subordinated　to　it；
while　it　is　not　postponed　to　any　other。　To　every　faculty　of　the　mind
we　can　attribute　an　interest；　that　is；　a　principle；　that　contains
the　condition　on　which　alone　the　former　is　called　into　exercise。
Reason；　as　the　faculty　of　principles；　determines　the　interest　of　all
the　powers　of　the　mind　and　is　determined　by　its　own。　The　interest　of
its　speculative　employment　consists　in　the　cognition　of　the　object
pushed　to　the　highest　a　priori　principles：　that　of　its　practical
employment；　in　the　determination　of　the　will　in　respect　of　the　final
and　plete　end。　As　to　what　is　necessary　for　the　possibility　of　any
employment　of　reason　at　all；　namely；　that　its　principles　and
affirmations　should　not　contradict　one　another；　this　constitutes　no
part　of　its　interest；　but　is　the　condition　of　having　reason　at　all；　it
is　only　its　development；　not　mere　consistency　with　itself；　that　is
reckoned　as　its　interest。
　　If　practical　reason　could　not　assume　or　think　as　given　anything
further　than　what　speculative　reason　of　itself　could　offer　it　from　its
own　insight；　the　latter　would　have　the　primacy。　But　supposing　that
it　had　of　itself　original　a　priori　principles　with　which　certain
theoretical　positions　were　inseparably　connected；　while　these　were
withdrawn　from　any　possible　insight　of　speculative　reason　（which；
however；　they　must　not　contradict）；　then　the　question　is：　Which
interest　is　the　superior　（not　which　must　give　way；　for　they　are　not
necessarily　conflicting）；　whether　speculative　reason；　which　knows
nothing　of　all　that　the　practical　offers　for　its　acceptance；　should
take　up　these　propositions　and　（although　they　transcend　it）　try　to
unite　them　with　its　own　concepts　as　a　foreign　possession　handed　over
to　it；　or　whether　it　is　justified　in　obstinately　following　its　own
separate　interest　and；　according　to　the　canonic　of　Epicurus；　rejecting
as　vain　subtlety　everything　that　cannot　accredit　its　objective　reality
by　manifest　examples　to　be　shown　in　experience；　even　though　it
should　be　never　so　much　interwoven　with　the　interest　of　the
practical　（pure）　use　of　reason；　and　in　itself　not　contradictory　to　the
theoretical；　merely　because　it　infringes　on　the　interest　of　the
speculative　reason　to　this　extent；　that　it　removes　the　bounds　which
this　latter　had　set　to　itself；　and　gives　it　up　to　every　nonsense　or
delusion　of　imagination？
　　In　fact；　so　far　as　practical　reason　is　taken　as　dependent　on
pathological　conditions；　that　is；　as　merely　regulating　the
inclinations　under　the　sensible　principle　of　happiness；　we　could　not
require　speculative　reason　to　take　its　principles　from　such　a
source。　Mohammed's　paradise；　or　the　absorption　into　the　Deity　of　the
theosophists　and　mystics　would　press　their　monstrosities　on　the　reason
according　to　the　taste　of　each；　and　one　might　as　well　have　no　reason
as　surrender　it　in　such　fashion　to　all　sorts　of　dreams。　But　if　pure
reason　of　itself　can　be　practical　and　is　actually　so；　as　the
consciousness　of　the　moral　law　proves；　then　it　is　still　only　one　and
the　same　reason　which；　whether　in　a　theoretical　or　a　practical　point
of　view；　judges　according　to　a　priori　principles；　and　then　it　is　clear
that　although　it　is　in　the　first　point　of　view　inpetent　to
establish　certain　propositions　positively；　which；　however；　do　not
contradict　it；　then；　as　soon　as　these　propositions　are　inseparably
attached　to　the　practical　interest　of　pure　reason；　it　must　accept
them；　though　it　be　as　something　offered　to　it　from　a　foreign　source；
something　that　has　not　grown　on　its　own　ground；　but　yet　is
sufficiently　authenticated；　and　it　must　try　to　pare　and　connect
them　with　everything　that　it　has　in　its　power　as　speculative　reason。
It　must　remember；　however；　that　these　are　not　additions　to　its
insight；　but　yet　are　extensions　of　its　employment　in　another；
namely；　a　practical　aspect；　and　this　is　not　in　the　least　opposed　to
its　interest；　which　consists　in　the　restriction　of　wild　speculation。
　　Thus；　when　pure　speculative　and　pure　practical　reason　are　bined
in　one　cognition；　the　latter　has　the　primacy；　provided；　namely；　that
this　bination　is　not　contingent　and　arbitrary；　but　founded　a　priori
on　reason　itself　and　therefore　necessary。　For　without　this
subordination　there　would　arise　a　conflict　of　reason　with　itself；
since；　if　they　were　merely　co…ordinate；　the　former　would　close　its
boundaries　strictly　and　admit　nothing　from　the　latter　into　its　domain；
while　the　latter　would　extend　its　bounds　over　everything　and　when
its　needs　required　would　seek　to　embrace　the　former　within　them。　Nor
could　we　reverse　the　order　and　require　pure　practical　reason　to　be
subordinate　to　the　speculative；　since　all　interest　is　ultimately
practical；　and　even　that　of　speculative　reason　is　conditional；　and
it　is　only　in　the　practical　employment　of　reason　that　it　is　plete。

　　　　　IV。　The　Immortality　of　the　Soul　as　a　Postulate　of
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　The　realization　of　the　summum　bonum　in　the　world　is　the　necessary
object　of　a　will　determinable　by　the　moral　law。　But　in　this　will　the
perfect　accordance　of　the　mind　with　the　moral　law　is　the　supreme
condition　of　the　summum　bonum。　This　then　must　be　possible；　as　well
as　its　object；　since　it　is　contained　in　the　mand　to