the+critique+of+practical+reason-第30部分

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non）　of　happiness；　not　with　the　means　of　attaining　it。　But　when
morality　has　been　pletely　expounded　（which　merely　imposes　duties
instead　of　providing　rules　for　selfish　desires）；　then　first；　after　the
moral　desire　to　promote　the　summum　bonum　（to　bring　the　kingdom　of
God　to　us）　has　been　awakened；　a　desire　founded　on　a　law；　and　which
could　not　previously　arise　in　any　selfish　mind；　and　when　for　the
behoof　of　this　desire　the　step　to　religion　has　been　taken；　then　this
ethical　doctrine　may　be　also　called　a　doctrine　of　happiness　because
the　hope　of　happiness　first　begins　with　religion　only。
　　We　can　also　see　from　this　that；　when　we　ask　what　is　God's　ultimate
end　in　creating　the　world；　we　must　not　name　the　happiness　of　the
rational　beings　in　it；　but　the　summum　bonum；　which　adds　a　further
condition　to　that　wish　of　such　beings；　namely；　the　condition　of
being　worthy　of　happiness；　that　is；　the　morality　of　these　same
rational　beings；　a　condition　which　alone　contains　the　rule　by　which
only　they　can　hope　to　share　in　the　former　at　the　hand　of　a　wise
Author。　For　as　wisdom；　theoretically　considered；　signifies　the
knowledge　of　the　summum　bonum　and；　practically；　the　accordance　of
the　will　with　the　summum　bonum；　we　cannot　attribute　to　a　supreme
independent　wisdom　an　end　based　merely　on　goodness。　For　we　cannot
conceive　the　action　of　this　goodness　（in　respect　of　the　happiness　of
rational　beings）　as　suitable　to　the　highest　original　good；　except
under　the　restrictive　conditions　of　harmony　with　the　holiness*　of
his　will。　Therefore；　those　who　placed　the　end　of　creation　in　the　glory
of　God　（provided　that　this　is　not　conceived　anthropomorphically　as　a
desire　to　be　praised）　have　perhaps　hit　upon　the　best　expression。　For
nothing　glorifies　God　more　than　that　which　is　the　most　estimable　thing
in　the　world；　respect　for　his　mand；　the　observance　of　the　holy　duty
that　his　law　imposes　on　us；　when　there　is　added　thereto　his　glorious
plan　of　crowning　such　a　beautiful　order　of　things　with　corresponding
happiness。　If　the　latter　（to　speak　humanly）　makes　Him　worthy　of
love；　by　the　former　He　is　an　object　of　adoration。　Even　men　can　never
acquire　respect　by　benevolence　alone；　though　they　may　gain　love；　so
that　the　greatest　beneficence　only　procures　them　honour　when　it　is
regulated　by　worthiness。

　　*In　order　to　make　these　characteristics　of　these　conceptions
clear；　I　add　the　remark　that　whilst　we　ascribe　to　God　various
attributes；　the　quality　of　which　we　also　find　applicable　to　creatures；
only　that　in　Him　they　are　raised　to　the　highest　degree；　e。g。；　power；
knowledge；　presence；　goodness；　etc。；　under　the　designations　of
omnipotence；　omniscience；　omnipresence；　etc。；　there　are　three　that　are
ascribed　to　God　exclusively；　and　yet　without　the　addition　of
greatness；　and　which　are　all　moral　He　is　the　only　holy；　the　only
blessed；　the　only　wise；　because　these　conceptions　already　imply　the
absence　of　limitation。　In　the　order　of　these　attributes　He　is　also　the
holy　lawgiver　（and　creator）；　the　good　governor　（and　preserver）　and　the
just　judge；　three　attributes　which　include　everything　by　which　God
is　the　object　of　religion；　and　in　conformity　with　which　the
metaphysical　perfections　are　added　of　themselves　in　the　reason。

　　That　in　the　order　of　ends；　man　（and　with　him　every　rational　being）
is　an　end　in　himself；　that　is；　that　he　can　never　be　used　merely　as　a
means　by　any　（not　even　by　God）　without　being　at　the　same　time　an　end
also　himself；　that　therefore　humanity　in　our　person　must　be　holy　to
ourselves；　this　follows　now　of　itself　because　he　is　the　subject　of　the
moral　law；　in　other　words；　of　that　which　is　holy　in　itself；　and　on
account　of　which　and　in　agreement　with　which　alone　can　anything　be
termed　holy。　For　this　moral　law　is　founded　on　the　autonomy　of　his
will；　as　a　free　will　which　by　its　universal　laws　must　necessarily　be
able　to　agree　with　that　to　which　it　is　to　submit　itself。

　　　　VI。　Of　the　Postulates　of　Pure　Practical　Reason　Generally。

　　They　all　proceed　from　the　principle　of　morality；　which　is　not　a
postulate　but　a　law；　by　which　reason　determines　the　will　directly；
which　will；　because　it　is　so　determined　as　a　pure　will；　requires　these
necessary　conditions　of　obedience　to　its　precept。　These　postulates　are
not　theoretical　dogmas　but；　suppositions　practically　necessary；
while　then　they　do　＇not＇　extend　our　speculative　knowledge；　they　give
objective　reality　to　the　ideas　of　speculative　reason　in　general　（by
means　of　their　reference　to　what　is　practical）；　and　give　it　a　right　to
concepts；　the　possibility　even　of　which　it　could　not　otherwise　venture
to　affirm。
　　These　postulates　are　those　of　immortality；　freedom　positively
considered　（as　the　causality　of　a　being　so　far　as　he　belongs　to　the
intelligible　world）；　and　the　existence　of　God。　The　first　results
from　the　practically　necessary　condition　of　a　duration　adequate　to　the
plete　fulfilment　of　the　moral　law；　the　second　from　the　necessary
supposition　of　independence　of　the　sensible　world；　and　of　the
faculty　of　determining　one's　will　according　to　the　law　of　an
intelligible　world；　that　is；　of　freedom；　the　third　from　the
necessary　condition　of　the　existence　of　the　summum　bonum　in　such　an
intelligible　world；　by　the　supposition　of　the　supreme　independent
good；　that　is；　the　existence　of　God。
　　Thus　the　fact　that　respect　for　the　moral　law　necessarily　makes　the
summum　bonum　an　object　of　our　endeavours；　and　the　supposition　thence
resulting　of　its　objective　reality；　lead　through　the　postulates　of
practical　reason　to　conceptions　which　speculative　reason　might
indeed　present　as　problems；　but　could　never　solve。　Thus　it　leads：　1。
To　that　one　in　the　solution　of　which　the　latter　could　do　nothing　but
mit　paralogisms　（namely；　that　of　immortality）；　because　it　could　not
lay　hold　of　the　character　of　permanence；　by　which　to　plete　the
psychological　conception　of　an　ultimate　subject　necessarily　ascribed
to　the　soul　in　self…consciousness；　so　as　to　make　it　the　real
conception　of　a　substance；　a　character　which　practical　reason
furnishes　by　the　postulate　of　a　duration　required　for　accordance
with　the　moral　law　in　the　summum　bonum；　which　is　the　whole　end　of
practical　reason。　2。　It　leads　to　that　of　which　speculative　reason
contained　nothing　but　antinomy；　the　solution　of　which　it　could　only
found　on　a　notion　Problematically　conceivable　indeed；　but　whose
objective　reality　it　could　not　prove　or　determine；　namely；　the
cosmological　idea　of　an　intelligible　world　and　the　consciousness　of
our　existence　in　it；　by　means　of　the　postulate　of　freedom　（the　reality
of　which　it　lays　down　by　virtue　of　the　moral　law）；　and　with　it
likewise　the　law　of　an　intelligible　world；　to　which　speculative　reason
could　only　point；　but　could　not　define　its　conception。　3。　What
speculative　reason　was　able　to　think；　but　was　obliged　to　leave
undetermined　as　a　mere　transcendental　ideal；　viz。；　the　theological
conception　of　the　first　Being；　to　this　it　gives　significance　（in　a
practical　view；　that　is；　as　a　condition　of　the　possibility　of　the
object　of　a　will　determined　by　that　law）；　namely；　as　the　supreme
principle　of　the　summum　bonum　in　an　intelligible　world；　by　means　of
moral　legislation　in　it　invested　with　sovereign　power。
　　Is　our　knowledge；　however；　actually　extended　in　this　way　by　pure
practical　reason；　and　is　that　immanent　in　practical　reason　which　for
the　speculative　was　only　transcendent？　Certainly；　but　only　in　a
practical　point　of　view。　For　we　do　not　thereby　take　knowledge　of　the
nature　of　our　souls；　nor　of　the　intelligible　world；　nor　of　the　Supreme
Being；　with　respect　to　what　they　are　in　themselves；　but　we　have　merely
bined　the　conceptions　of　them　in　the　practical　concept　of　the
summum　bonum　as　the　object　of　our　will；　and　this　altogether　a
priori；　but　only　by　means　of　the　moral　law；　and　merely　in　reference　to
it；　in　respect　of　the　object　which　it　mands。　But　how　freedom　is
possible；　and　how　we　are　to　conceive　this　kind　of　causality
theoretically　and　positively；　is　not　thereby　discovered；　but　only　that
there　is　such　a　causality　is　postulated　by　the　moral　law　and　in　its
behoof。　It　is　the　same　with　the　remaining　ideas；　the　possibility　of
which　no　human　intelligence　will　ever　fathom；　but　the　truth　of
which；　on　the　other　hand；　no　sophistry　will　ever　wrest　from　the
conviction　even　of　the　monest　man。

　　VII。　How　is　it　possible　to　conceive　an　Extension　of　Pure
　　　　　　　Reason　in　a　Practical　point　of　view；　without　its
　　　　　　　　　　Knowledge　as　Speculative　being　enlarged　at
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　the　same　time？

　　In　order　not　to　be　too　abstract；　we　will　answer　this　question　at
once　in　its　application　to　the　present　case。　In　order　to　extend　a　pure
cognition　practically；　there　must　be　an　a　priori　purpose　given；　that
is；　an　end　as　object　（of　the　will）；　which　independently　of　all
theological　principle　is　presented　as　practically　necessary　by　an
imperative　which　determines　the　will　directly　（a　categorical
imperative）；　and　in　this　case　that　is　the　summum　bonum。　This；　however；
is　not　possible　without　presupposing　three　theoretical　conceptions
（for　which；　because　they　are　mere　conceptions　of　pure　reason；　no
corresponding　intuition　can　be　found；　nor　consequently　by　the　path
of　theory　any　objective　reality）；　namely；　freedom；　immortality；　and
God。　Thus　by　the　practical　law　which　mands　the　existence　of　the
highest　good　possible　in　a　world；　the　possibility　of　those　objects
of　pure　speculative　reason　is　postulated；　and　the　objective　reality
which　the　latter　could　not　assure　them。　By　this　the　theoretical
knowledge　of　pure　reason　does　indeed　obtain　an　accession；　but　it
consists　only　in　this；　that　those　concepts　which　otherwise　it　had　to
look　upon　as　problematical　（merely　thinkable）　concepts；　are　now
shown　assertorially　to　be　such　as　actually　have　objects；　because
practical　reason　indispensably　requires　their　existence　for　the
possibility　of　its　object；　the　summum　bonum；　which　practically　is
absolutely　necessary；　and　this　justifies　theoretical　reason　in
assuming　them。　But　this　extension　of　theoretical　reason　is　no
extension　of　speculative；　that　is；　we　cannot　make　any　positive　use
of　it　in　a　theoretical　point　of　view。　For　as　nothing　is　acplished
in　this　by　practical　reason；　further　than　that