the+critique+of+practical+reason-第33部分

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grounds；　that　the　means　thereto　are　possible　or　that　its　object　is
real。　This；　then；　is　an　absolutely　necessary　requirement；　and　what
it　pre…supposes　is　not　merely　justified　as　an　allowable　hypothesis；
but　as　a　postulate　in　a　practical　point　of　view；　and　admitting　that
the　pure　moral　law　inexorably　binds　every　man　as　a　mand　（not　as　a
rule　of　prudence）；　the　righteous　man　may　say：　〃I　will　that　there　be
a　God；　that　my　existence　in　this　world　be　also　an　existence　outside
the　chain　of　physical　causes　and　in　a　pure　world　of　the　understanding；
and　lastly；　that　my　duration　be　endless；　I　firmly　abide　by　this；　and
will　not　let　this　faith　be　taken　from　me；　for　in　this　instance　alone
my　interest；　because　I　must　not　relax　anything　of　it；　inevitably
determines　my　judgement；　without　regarding　sophistries；　however　unable
I　may　be　to　answer　them　or　to　oppose　them　with　others　more
plausible。*＇2＇

　　*But　even　here　we　should　not　be　able　to　allege　a　requirement　of
reason；　if　we　had　not　before　our　eyes　a　problematical；　but　yet
inevitable；　conception　of　reason；　namely；　that　of　an　absolutely
necessary　being。　This　conception　now　seeks　to　be　defined；　and　this；　in
addition　to　the　tendency　to　extend　itself；　is　the　objective　ground
of　a　requirement　of　speculative　reason；　namely；　to　have　a　more　precise
definition　of　the　conception　of　a　necessary　being　which　is　to　serve　as
the　first　cause　of　other　beings；　so　as　to　make　these　latter　knowable
by　some　means。　Without　such　antecedent　necessary　problems　there　are　no
requirements…　at　least　not　of　pure　reason…　the　rest　are　requirements
of　inclination。
　　*＇2＇　In　the　Deutsches　Museum；　February；　1787；　there　is　a
dissertation　by　a　very　subtle　and　clear…headed　man；　the　late
Wizenmann；　whose　early　death　is　to　be　lamented；　in　which　he　disputes
the　right　to　argue　from　a　want　to　the　objective　reality　of　its　object；
and　illustrates　the　point　by　the　example　of　a　man　in　love；　who
having　fooled　himself　into　an　idea　of　beauty；　which　is　merely　a
chimera　of　his　own　brain；　would　fain　conclude　that　such　an　object
really　exists　somewhere。　I　quite　agree　with　him　in　this；　in　all
cases　where　the　want　is　founded　on　inclination；　which　cannot
necessarily　postulate　the　existence　of　its　object　even　for　the　man
that　is　affected　by　it；　much　less　can　it　contain　a　demand　valid　for
everyone；　and　therefore　it　is　merely　a　subjective　ground　of　the
wish。　But　in　the　present　case　we　have　a　want　of　reason　springing
from　an　objective　determining　principle　of　the　will；　namely；　the　moral
law；　which　necessarily　binds　every　rational　being；　and　therefore
justifies　him　in　assuming　a　priori　in　nature　the　conditions　proper　for
it；　and　makes　the　latter　inseparable　from　the　plete　practical　use
of　reason。　It　is　a　duty　to　realize　the　summum　bonum　to　the　utmost　of
our　power；　therefore　it　must　be　possible；　consequently　it　is
unavoidable　for　every　rational　being　in　the　world　to　assume　what　is
necessary　for　its　objective　possibility。　The　assumption　is　as
necessary　as　the　moral　law；　in　connection　with　which　alone　it　is
valid。

　　In　order　to　prevent　misconception　in　the　use　of　a　notion　as　yet　so
unusual　as　that　of　a　faith　of　pure　practical　reason；　let　me　be
permitted　to　add　one　more　remark。　It　might　almost　seem　as　if　this
rational　faith　were　here　announced　as　itself　a　mand；　namely；　that
we　should　assume　the　summum　bonum　as　possible。　But　a　faith　that　is
manded　is　nonsense。　Let　the　preceding　analysis；　however；　be
remembered　of　what　is　required　to　be　supposed　in　the　conception　of　the
summum　bonum；　and　it　will　be　seen　that　it　cannot　be　manded　to
assume　this　possibility；　and　no　practical　disposition　of　mind　is
required　to　admit　it；　but　that　speculative　reason　must　concede　it
without　being　asked；　for　no　one　can　affirm　that　it　is　impossible　in
itself　that　rational　beings　in　the　world　should　at　the　same　time　be
worthy　of　happiness　in　conformity　with　the　moral　law　and　also
possess　this　happiness　proportionately。　Now　in　respect　of　the　first
element　of　the　summum　bonum；　namely；　that　which　concerns　morality；　the
moral　law　gives　merely　a　mand；　and　to　doubt　the　possibility　of　that
element　would　be　the　same　as　to　call　in　question　the　moral　law　itself。
But　as　regards　the　second　element　of　that　object；　namely；　happiness
perfectly　proportioned　to　that　worthiness；　it　is　true　that　there　is　no
need　of　a　mand　to　admit　its　possibility　in　general；　for　theoretical
reason　has　nothing　to　say　against　it；　but　the　manner　in　which　we
have　to　conceive　this　harmony　of　the　laws　of　nature　with　those　of
freedom　has　in　it　something　in　respect　of　which　we　have　a　choice；
because　theoretical　reason　decides　nothing　with　apodeictic　certainty
about　it；　and　in　respect　of　this　there　may　be　a　moral　interest　which
turns　the　scale。
　　I　had　said　above　that　in　a　mere　course　of　nature　in　the　world　an
accurate　correspondence　between　happiness　and　moral　worth　is　not　to　be
expected　and　must　be　regarded　as　impossible；　and　that　therefore　the
possibility　of　the　summum　bonum　cannot　be　admitted　from　this　side
except　on　the　supposition　of　a　moral　Author　of　the　world。　I
purposely　reserved　the　restriction　of　this　judgement　to　the　subjective
conditions　of　our　reason；　in　order　not　to　make　use　of　it　until　the
manner　of　this　belief　should　be　defined　more　precisely。　The　fact　is
that　the　impossibility　referred　to　is　merely　subjective；　that　is；
our　reason　finds　it　impossible　for　it　to　render　conceivable　in　the　way
of　a　mere　course　of　nature　a　connection　so　exactly　proportioned　and　so
thoroughly　adapted　to　an　end；　between　two　sets　of　events　happening
according　to　such　distinct　laws；　although；　as　with　everything　else
in　nature　that　is　adapted　to　an　end；　it　cannot　prove；　that　is；　show　by
sufficient　objective　reason；　that　it　is　not　possible　by　universal　laws
of　nature。
　　Now；　however；　a　deciding　principle　of　a　different　kind　es　into
play　to　turn　the　scale　in　this　uncertainty　of　speculative　reason。
The　mand　to　promote　the　summum　bonum　is　established　on　an　objective
basis　（in　practical　reason）；　the　possibility　of　the　same　in　general　is
likewise　established　on　an　objective　basis　（in　theoretical　reason；
which　has　nothing　to　say　against　it）。　But　reason　cannot　decide
objectively　in　what　way　we　are　to　conceive　this　possibility；　whether
by　universal　laws　of　nature　without　a　wise　Author　presiding　over
nature；　or　only　on　supposition　of　such　an　Author。　Now　here　there　es
in　a　subjective　condition　of　reason；　the　only　way　theoretically
possible　for　it；　of　conceiving　the　exact　harmony　of　the　kingdom　of
nature　with　the　kingdom　of　morals；　which　is　the　condition　of　the
possibility　of　the　summum　bonum；　and　at　the　same　time　the　only　one
conducive　to　morality　（which　depends　on　an　objective　law　of　reason）。
Now　since　the　promotion　of　this　summum　bonum；　and　therefore　the
supposition　of　its　possibility；　are　objectively　necessary　（though　only
as　a　result　of　practical　reason）；　while　at　the　same　time　the　manner　in
which　we　would　conceive　it　rests　with　our　own　choice；　and　in　this
choice　a　free　interest　of　pure　practical　reason　decides　for　the
assumption　of　a　wise　Author　of　the　world；　it　is　clear　that　the
principle　that　herein　determines　our　judgement；　though　as　a　want　it　is
subjective；　yet　at　the　same　time　being　the　means　of　promoting　what
is　objectively　（practically）　necessary；　is　the　foundation　of　a　maxim
of　belief　in　a　moral　point　of　view；　that　is；　a　faith　of　pure　practical
reason。　This；　then；　is　not　manded；　but　being　a　voluntary
determination　of　our　judgement；　conducive　to　the　moral　（manded）
purpose；　and　moreover　harmonizing　with　the　theoretical　requirement
of　reason；　to　assume　that　existence　and　to　make　it　the　foundation　of
our　further　employment　of　reason；　it　has　itself　sprung　from　the
moral　disposition　of　mind；　it　may　therefore　at　times　waver　even　in　the
well…disposed；　but　can　never　be　reduced　to　unbelief。

　　　　IX。　Of　the　Wise　Adaptation　of　Man's　Cognitive　Faculties
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　to　his　Practical　Destination。

　　If　human　nature　is　destined　to　endeavour　after　the　summum　bonum；
we　must　suppose　also　that　the　measure　of　its　cognitive　faculties；
and　particularly　their　relation　to　one　another；　is　suitable　to　this
end。　Now　the　Critique　of　Pure　Speculative　Reason　proves　that　this　is
incapable　of　solving　satisfactorily　the　most　weighty　problems　that　are
proposed　to　it；　although　it　does　not　ignore　the　natural　and
important　hints　received　from　the　same　reason；　nor　the　great　steps
that　it　can　make　to　approach　to　this　great　goal　that　is　set　before　it；
which；　however；　it　can　never　reach　of　itself；　even　with　the　help　of
the　greatest　knowledge　of　nature。　Nature　then　seems　here　to　have
provided　us　only　in　a　stepmotherly　fashion　with　the　faculty　required
for　our　end。
　　Suppose；　now；　that　in　this　matter　nature　had　conformed　to　our　wish
and　had　given　us　that　capacity　of　discernment　or　that　enlightenment
which　we　would　gladly　possess；　or　which　some　imagine　they　actually
possess；　what　would　in　all　probability　be　the　consequence？　Unless
our　whole　nature　were　at　the　same　time　changed；　our　inclinations；
which　always　have　the　first　word；　would　first　of　all　demand　their
own　satisfaction；　and；　joined　with　rational　reflection；　the　greatest
possible　and　most　lasting　satisfaction；　under　the　name　of　happiness；
the　moral　law　would　afterwards　speak；　in　order　to　keep　them　within
their　proper　bounds；　and　even　to　subject　them　all　to　a　higher　end；
which　has　no　regard　to　inclination。　But　instead　of　the　conflict　that
the　moral　disposition　has　now　to　carry　on　with　the　inclinations；　in
which；　though　after　some　defeats；　moral　strength　of　mind　may　be
gradually　acquired；　God　and　eternity　with　their　awful　majesty　would
stand　unceasingly　before　our　eyes　（for　what　we　can　prove　perfectly
is　to　us　as　certain　as　that　of　which　we　are　assured　by　the　sight　of
our　eyes）。　Transgression　of　the　law；　would；　no　doubt；　be　avoided；　what
is　manded　would　be　done；　but　the　mental　disposition；　from　which
actions　ought　to　proceed；　cannot　be　infused　by　any　mand；　and　in
this　case　the　spur　of　action　is　ever　active　and　external；　so　that
reason　has　no　need　to　exert　itself　in　order　to　gather　strength　to
resist　the　inclinations　by　a　lively　representation　of　the　dignity　of
the　law：　hence　most　of