the+critique+of+practical+reason-第6部分
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not on objective； but on subjective conditions of choice； and hence
that they must always be represented as mere maxims； never as
practical laws。 This second remark seems at first sight to be mere
verbal refinement； but it defines the terms of the most important
distinction which can e into consideration in practical
investigations。
IV。 THEOREM II。
A rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal
laws； unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will；
not by their matter； but by their form only。
By the matter of a practical principle I mean the object of the
will。 This object is either the determining ground of the will or it
is not。 In the former case the rule of the will is subjected to an
empirical condition （viz。； the relation of the determining idea to the
feeling of pleasure and pain）； consequently it can not be a
practical law。 Now； when we abstract from a law all matter； i。e。；
every object of the will （as a determining principle）； nothing is left
but the mere form of a universal legislation。 Therefore； either a
rational being cannot conceive his subjective practical principles；
that is； his maxims； as being at the same time universal laws； or he
must suppose that their mere form； by which they are fitted for
universal legislation； is alone what makes them practical laws。
REMARK。
The monest understanding can distinguish without instruction what
form of maxim is adapted for universal legislation； and what is not。
Suppose； for example； that I have made it my maxim to increase my
fortune by every safe means。 Now； I have a deposit in my hands； the
owner of which is dead and has left no writing about it。 This is
just the case for my maxim。 I desire then to know whether that maxim
can also bold good as a universal practical law。 I apply it；
therefore； to the present case； and ask whether it could take the form
of a law； and consequently whether I can by my maxim at the same
time give such a law as this； that everyone may deny a deposit of
which no one can produce a proof。 I at once bee aware that such a
principle； viewed as a law； would annihilate itself； because the
result would be that there would be no deposits。 A practical law which
I recognise as such must be qualified for universal legislation；
this is an identical proposition and； therefore； self…evident。 Now； if
I say that my will is subject to a practical law； I cannot adduce my
inclination （e。g。； in the present case my avarice） as a principle of
determination fitted to be a universal practical law； for this is so
far from being fitted for a universal legislation that； if put in
the form of a universal law； it would destroy itself。
It is； therefore； surprising that intelligent men could have thought
of calling the desire of happiness a universal practical law on the
ground that the desire is universal； and； therefore； also the maxim by
which everyone makes this desire determine his will。 For whereas in
other cases a universal law of nature makes everything harmonious；
here； on the contrary； if we attribute to the maxim the universality
of a law； the extreme opposite of harmony will follow； the greatest
opposition and the plete destruction of the maxim itself and its
purpose。 For； in that case； the will of all has not one and the same
object； but everyone has his own （his private welfare）； which may
accidentally accord with the purposes of others which are equally
selfish； but it is far from sufficing for a law； because the
occasional exceptions which one is permitted to make are endless；
and cannot be definitely embraced in one universal rule。 In this
manner； then； results a harmony like that which a certain satirical
poem depicts as existing between a married couple bent on going to
ruin； 〃O； marvellous harmony； what he wishes； she wishes also〃； or
like what is said of the pledge of Francis I to the Emperor Charles V；
〃What my brother Charles wishes that I wish also〃 （viz。； Milan）。
Empirical principles of determination are not fit for any universal
external legislation； but just as little for internal； for each man
makes his own subject the foundation of his inclination； and in the
same subject sometimes one inclination； sometimes another； has the
preponderance。 To discover a law which would govern them all under
this condition； namely； bringing them all into harmony； is quite
impossible。
V。 PROBLEM I。
Supposing that the mere legislative form of maxims is alone the
sufficient determining principle of a will； to find the nature of
the will which can be determined by it alone。
Since the bare form of the law can only be conceived by reason； and
is； therefore； not an object of the senses； and consequently does
not belong to the class of phenomena； it follows that the idea of
it； which determines the will； is distinct from all the principles
that determine events in nature according to the law of causality；
because in their case the determining principles must themselves be
phenomena。 Now； if no other determining principle can serve as a law
for the will except that universal legislative form； such a will
must be conceived as quite independent of the natural law of phenomena
in their mutual relation； namely； the law of causality； such
independence is called freedom in the strictest； that is； in the
transcendental； sense； consequently； a will which can have its law
in nothing but the mere legislative form of the maxim is a free will。
VI。 PROBLEM II。
Supposing that a will is free； to find the law which alone is
petent to determine it necessarily。
Since the matter of the practical law； i。e。； an object of the maxim；
can never be given otherwise than empirically； and the free will is
independent on empirical conditions （that is； conditions belonging
to the world of sense） and yet is determinable； consequently a free
will must find its principle of determination in the law； and yet
independently of the matter of the law。 But； besides the matter of the
law； nothing is contained in it except the legislative form。 It is the
legislative form； then； contained in the maxim； which can alone
constitute a principle of determination of the ＇free＇ will。
REMARK。
Thus freedom and an unconditional practical law reciprocally imply
each other。 Now I do not ask here whether they are in fact distinct；
or whether an unconditioned law is not rather merely the consciousness
of a pure practical reason and the latter identical with the
positive concept of freedom； I only ask； whence begins our knowledge
of the unconditionally practical； whether it is from freedom or from
the practical law？ Now it cannot begin from freedom； for of this we
cannot be immediately conscious； since the first concept of it is
negative； nor can we infer it from experience； for experience gives us
the knowledge only of the law of phenomena； and hence of the mechanism
of nature； the direct opposite of freedom。 It is therefore the moral
law； of which we bee directly conscious （as soon as we trace for
ourselves maxims of the will）； that first presents itself to us； and
leads directly to the concept of freedom； inasmuch as reason
presents it as a principle of determination not to be outweighed by
any sensible conditions； nay； wholly independent of them。 But how is
the consciousness； of that moral law possible？ We can bee conscious
of pure practical laws just as we are conscious of pure theoretical
principles； by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes
them and to the elimination of all empirical conditions； which it
directs。 The concept of a pure will arises out of the former； as
that of a pure understanding arises out of the latter。 That this is
the true subordination of our concepts； and that it is morality that
first discovers to us the notion of freedom； hence that it is
practical reason which； with this concept； first proposes to
speculative reason the most insoluble problem； thereby placing it in
the greatest perplexity； is evident from the following
consideration： Since nothing in phenomena can be explained by the
concept of freedom； but the mechanism of nature must constitute the
only clue； moreover； when pure reason tries to ascend in the series of
causes to the unconditioned； it falls into an antinomy which is
entangled in inprehensibilities on the one side as much as the
other； whilst the latter （namely； mechanism） is at least useful in the
explanation of phenomena； therefore no one would ever have been so
rash as to introduce freedom into science； had not the moral law；
and with it practical reason； e in and forced this notion upon
us。 Experience； however； confirms this order of notions。 Suppose
some one asserts of his lustful appetite that； when the desired object
and the opportunity are present； it is quite irresistible。 ＇Ask
him＇… if a gallows were erected before the house where he finds this
opportunity； in order that he should be hanged thereon immediately
after the gratification of his lust； whether he could not then control
his passion； we need not be long in doubt what he would reply。 Ask
him； however… if his sovereign ordered him； on pain of the same
immediate execution； to bear false witness against an honourable
man； whom the prince might wish to destroy under a plausible
pretext； would he consider it possible in that case to overe his
love of life； however great it may be。 He would perhaps not venture to
affirm whether he would do so or not； but he must unhesitatingly admit
that it is possible to do so。 He judges； therefore； that he can do a
certain thing because he is conscious that he ought； and he recognizes
that he is free… a fact which but for the moral law he would never
have known。
VII。 FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL REASON。
Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold
good as a principle of universal legislation。
REMARK。
Pure geometry has postulates which are practical propositions； but
contain nothing further than the assumption that we can do something
if it is required that we
