the+critique+of+practical+reason-第8部分

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happiness　of　others）　that　determined　the　pure　will；　but　it　was　the
form　of　law　only；　by　which　I　restricted　my　maxim；　founded　on
inclination；　so　as　to　give　it　the　universality　of　a　law；　and　thus　to
adapt　it　to　the　practical　reason；　and　it　is　this　restriction　alone；
and　not　the　addition　of　an　external　spring；　that　can　give　rise　to
the　notion　of　the　obligation　to　extend　the　maxim　of　my　self…love　to
the　happiness　of　others。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK　II。

　　The　direct　opposite　of　the　principle　of　morality　is；　when　the
principle　of　private　happiness　is　made　the　determining　principle　of
the　will；　and　with　this　is　to　be　reckoned；　as　I　have　shown　above；
everything　that　places　the　determining　principle　which　is　to　serve
as　a　law；　anywhere　but　in　the　legislative　form　of　the　maxim。　This
contradiction；　however；　is　not　merely　logical；　like　that　which　would
arise　between　rules　empirically　conditioned；　if　they　were　raised　to
the　rank　of　necessary　principles　of　cognition；　but　is　practical；　and
would　ruin　morality　altogether　were　not　the　voice　of　reason　in
reference　to　the　will　so　clear；　so　irrepressible；　so　distinctly
audible；　even　to　the　monest　men。　It　can　only；　indeed；　be　maintained
in　the　perplexing　speculations　of　the　schools；　which　are　bold　enough
to　shut　their　ears　against　that　heavenly　voice；　in　order　to　support
a　theory　that　costs　no　trouble。
　　Suppose　that　an　acquaintance　whom　you　otherwise　liked　were　to
attempt　to　justify　himself　to　you　for　having　borne　false　witness；
first　by　alleging　the；　in　his　view；　sacred　duty　of　consulting　his
own　happiness；　then　by　enumerating　the　advantages　which　he　had
gained　thereby；　pointing　out　the　prudence　he　had　shown　in　securing
himself　against　detection；　even　by　yourself；　to　whom　he　now　reveals
the　secret；　only　in　order　that　he　may　be　able　to　deny　it　at　any
time；　and　suppose　he　were　then　to　affirm；　in　all　seriousness；　that
he　has　fulfilled　a　true　human　duty；　you　would　either　laugh　in　his
face；　or　shrink　back　from　him　with　disgust；　and　yet；　if　a　man　has
regulated　his　principles　of　action　solely　with　a　view　to　his　own
advantage；　you　would　have　nothing　whatever　to　object　against　this　mode
of　proceeding。　Or　suppose　some　one　remends　you　a　man　as　steward；　as
a　man　to　whom　you　can　blindly　trust　all　your　affairs；　and；　in　order　to
inspire　you　with　confidence；　extols　him　as　a　prudent　man　who
thoroughly　understands　his　own　interest；　and　is　so　indefatigably
active　that　he　lets　slip　no　opportunity　of　advancing　it；　lastly；
lest　you　should　be　afraid　of　finding　a　vulgar　selfishness　in　him；
praises　the　good　taste　with　which　he　lives；　not　seeking　his　pleasure
in　money…making；　or　in　coarse　wantonness；　but　in　the　enlargement　of
his　knowledge；　in　instructive　intercourse　with　a　select　circle；　and
even　in　relieving　the　needy；　while　as　to　the　means　（which；　of
course；　derive　all　their　value　from　the　end）；　he　is　not　particular；
and　is　ready　to　use　other　people's　money　for　the　purpose　as　if　it　were
his　own；　provided　only　he　knows　that　he　can　do　so　safely；　and
without　discovery；　you　would　either　believe　that　the　remender　was
mocking　you；　or　that　he　had　lost　his　senses。　So　sharply　and　clearly
marked　are　the　boundaries　of　morality　and　self…love　that　even　the
monest　eye　cannot　fail　to　distinguish　whether　a　thing　belongs　to
the　one　or　the　other。　The　few　remarks　that　follow　may　appear
superfluous　where　the　truth　is　so　plain；　but　at　least　they　may　serve
to　give　a　little　more　distinctness　to　the　judgement　of　mon　sense。
　　The　principle　of　happiness　may；　indeed；　furnish　maxims；　but　never
such　as　would　be　petent　to　be　laws　of　the　will；　even　if　universal
happiness　were　made　the　object。　For　since　the　knowledge　of　this
rests　on　mere　empirical　data；　since　every　man's　judgement　on　it
depends　very　much　on　his　particular　point　of　view；　which　is　itself
moreover　very　variable；　it　can　supply　only　general　rules；　not
universal；　that　is；　it　can　give　rules　which　on　the　average　will　most
frequently　fit；　but　not　rules　which　must　hold　good　always　and
necessarily；　hence；　no　practical　laws　can　be　founded　on　it。　Just
because　in　this　case　an　object　of　choice　is　the　foundation　of　the　rule
and　must　therefore　precede　it；　the　rule　can　refer　to　nothing　but
what　is　＇felt＇；　and　therefore　it　refers　to　experience　and　is　founded
on　it；　and　then　the　variety　of　judgement　must　be　endless。　This
principle；　therefore；　does　not　prescribe　the　same　practical　rules　to
all　rational　beings；　although　the　rules　are　all　included　under　a
mon　title；　namely；　that　of　happiness。　The　moral　law；　however；　is
conceived　as　objectively　necessary；　only　because　it　holds　for　everyone
that　has　reason　and　will。
　　The　maxim　of　self…love　（prudence）　only　advises；　the　law　of
morality　mands。　Now　there　is　a　great　difference　between　that
which　we　are　advised　to　do　and　that　to　which　we　are　obliged。
　　The　monest　intelligence　can　easily　and　without　hesitation　see
what；　on　the　principle　of　autonomy　of　the　will；　requires　to　be　done；
but　on　supposition　of　heteronomy　of　the　will；　it　is　bard　and
requires　knowledge　of　the　world　to　see　what　is　to　be　done。　That　is
to　say；　what　duty　is；　is　plain　of　itself　to　everyone；　but　what　is　to
bring　true　durable　advantage；　such　as　will　extend　to　the　whole　of
one's　existence；　is　always　veiled　in　impenetrable　obscurity；　and
much　prudence　is　required　to　adapt　the　practical　rule　founded　on　it　to
the　ends　of　life；　even　tolerably；　by　making　proper　exceptions。　But　the
moral　law　mands　the　most　punctual　obedience　from　everyone；　it　must；
therefore；　not　be　so　difficult　to　judge　what　it　requires　to　be　done；
that　the　monest　unpractised　understanding；　even　without　worldly
prudence；　should　fail　to　apply　it　rightly。
　　It　is　always　in　everyone's　power　to　satisfy　the　categorical
mand　of　morality；　whereas　it　is　seldom　possible；　and　by　no　means　so
to　everyone；　to　satisfy　the　empirically　conditioned　precept　of
happiness；　even　with　regard　to　a　single　purpose。　The　reason　is　that　in
the　former　case　there　is　question　only　of　the　maxim；　which　must　be
genuine　and　pure；　but　in　the　latter　case　there　is　question　also　of
one's　capacity　and　physical　power　to　realize　a　desired　object。　A
mand　that　everyone　should　try　to　make　himself　happy　would　be
foolish；　for　one　never　mands　anyone　to　do　what　he　of　himself
infallibly　wishes　to　do。　We　must　only　mand　the　means；　or　rather
supply　them；　since　he　cannot　do　everything　that　he　wishes。　But　to
mand　morality　under　the　name　of　duty　is　quite　rational；　for；　in　the
first　place；　not　everyone　is　willing　to　obey　its　precepts　if　they
oppose　his　inclinations；　and　as　to　the　means　of　obeying　this　law；
these　need　not　in　this　case　be　taught；　for　in　this　respect　whatever　he
wishes　to　do　be　can　do。
　　He　who　has　lost　at　play　may　be　vexed　at　himself　and　his　folly；　but
if　he　is　conscious　of　having　cheated　at　play　（although　he　has　gained
thereby）；　he　must　despise　himself　as　soon　as　he　pares　himself
with　the　moral　law。　This　must；　therefore；　be　something　different
from　the　principle　of　private　happiness。　For　a　man　must　have　a
different　criterion　when　he　is　pelled　to　say　to　himself：　〃I　am　a
worthless　fellow；　though　I　have　filled　my　purse〃；　and　when　he　approves
himself；　and　says：　〃I　am　a　prudent　man；　for　I　have　enriched　my
treasure。〃
　　Finally；　there　is　something　further　in　the　idea　of　our　practical
reason；　which　acpanies　the　transgression　of　a　moral　law…　namely；
its　ill　desert。　Now　the　notion　of　punishment；　as　such；　cannot　be
united　with　that　of　being　a　partaker　of　happiness；　for　although
he　who　inflicts　the　punishment　may　at　the　same　time　have　the
benevolent　purpose　of　directing　this　punishment　to　this　end；　yet　it
must　first　be　justified　in　itself　as　punishment；　i。e。；　as　mere　harm；
so　that　if　it　stopped　there；　and　the　person　punished　could　get　no
glimpse　of　kindness　hidden　behind　this　harshness；　he　must　yet　admit
that　justice　was　done　him；　and　that　his　reward　was　perfectly
suitable　to　his　conduct。　In　every　punishment；　as　such；　there　must
first　be　justice；　and　this　constitutes　the　essence　of　the　notion。
Benevolence　may；　indeed；　be　united　with　it；　but　the　man　who　has
deserved　punishment　has　not　the　least　reason　to　reckon　upon　this。
Punishment；　then；　is　a　physical　evil；　which；　though　it　be　not
connected　with　moral　evil　as　a　natural　consequence；　ought　to　be
connected　with　it　as　a　consequence　by　the　principles　of　a　moral
legislation。　Now；　if　every　crime；　even　without　regarding　the
physical　consequence　with　respect　to　the　actor；　is　in　itself
punishable；　that　is；　forfeits　happiness　（at　least　partially）；　it　is
obviously　absurd　to　say　that　the　crime　consisted　just　in　this；　that　be
has　drawn　punishment　on　himself；　thereby　injuring　his　private
happiness　（which；　on　the　principle　of　self…love；　must　be　the　proper
notion　of　all　crime）。　According　to　this　view；　the　punishment　would
be　the　reason　for　calling　anything　a　crime；　and　justice　would；　on
the　contrary；　consist　in　omitting　all　punishment；　and　even
preventing　that　which　naturally　follows；　for；　if　this　were　done；　there
would　no　longer　be　any　evil　in　the　action；　since　the　harm　which
otherwise　followed　it；　and　on　account　of　which　alone　the　action　was
called　evil；　would　now　be　prevented。　To　look；　however；　on　all
rewards　and　punishments　as　merely　the　machinery　in　the　hand　of　a
higher　power；　which　is　to　serve　only　to　set　rational　creatures
striving　after　their　final　end　（happiness）；　this　is　to　reduce　the　will
to　a　mechanism　destructive　of　freedom；　this　is　so　evident　that　it　need
not　detain　us。
　　More　refined；　though　equally　false；　is　the　theory　of　those　who
suppose　a　certain　special　moral　sense；　which　sense　and　not　reason
determines　the　moral　law；　and　in　consequence　of　which　the
consciousness　of　virtue　is　supposed　to　be　directly　connected　with
contentment　and　pleasure；　that　of　vice；　with　mental　dissatisfaction
and　pain；　thus　reducing　the　whole　to　the　desire　of　private
happiness。　Without　repeating　what　has　been　said　above；　I　will　here
only　remark　the　fallacy　they　fall　into。　In　order　to　imagine　the
vicious　man　as　tormented　with　mental　dissatisfaction　by　the
consciousness　of　his　transgressions；　they　must　first　represent　him
as　in　the　main　basis　of　his　character；　at　least　in　some　degree；
morally　good；　just　as　he　who